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7Populism, a nightmare state of democracy, can result in elect-
ing someone very foolish, or perhaps criminal, or even, per-
haps, both.51
INTRODUCTION
or many years, scholars have been researching and dis-
cussing populism, from its contested definition to how it
relates with other norms, such as democracy, constitutionalism,
justice systems, human rights, and the media. The debate or dis-
cussion over populism has been renewed by the recent populist
wave in Europe and America. Populist leaders, like Donald
Trump, Julius Malema, Robert Mugabe, Marine Le Pen, and Re-
cep Tayyip Erdogan have all, reported by various media outlets,
publicly attacked human rights norms, international law, and
international institutions, to an extent that some commentators
believe that globalization and the human rights age have come
to an end.2 In Africa, populist leaders have been advocating for
withdrawal from many international law institutions.3 China
and Russia have also been attacking international institutions,
along with the norms that have ensured world security and
peace for decades. In that sense, some scholars observe that the
future of international law is not only uncertain because of these
developments, but is in fact severely threatened.
As part of what others perceive to be a post-human rights era
and an age of populism, demagoguery characterizes the current
political landscape across the globe where minorities and those
who are perceived to be outsiders are targeted.4 For example,
during his campaign, President Donald Trump verbally attacked
1. Gökmen Özgür, Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? 2 MKTS.,
GLOBALIZATION & DEV. REV. 1, at 1 (2017) (quoting William Gibson book re-
view).
2. See Kenneth Roth, The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on
Human Rights Values, 1, 4N5 (2017), in WORLD REPORT 2017, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-
rise-of-populism.
3. See African Union Backs Mass Withdrawal From ICC, BBCNEWS (Feb.
1, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38826073.
4. See id.
F
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and undermined migrants, Mexicans, people living with disabil-
ities, and women.5He also openly supported the idea of torturing
terror suspects on the mere basis that it works, its prohibition
by treaties and customary international law notwithstanding.6
Likewise, leaders like Robert Mugabe and Julias Malema have
unashamedly taken racist stances in public, referring to white
*eo*He as 7*ink noses5 anO a jJite Io&'naHist as a 7tJinL^57
While this article joins the debate on the challenges posed by
the current form of populism to democracy, human rights, con-
stitutionalism, international institutions, and international law
in general, the main question that this article seeks to answer is
whether electoral laws should give effect to human rights norms
that are part of customary international law. Conversely, this
article explores whether there is an international obligation on
states to exclude from public office candidates who plan to vio-
late such human rights norms.
Part I of this article will provide the definition of populism and
discuss the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that
have contributed to its rise^ Wt jiHH aHso assess tJe meOia’s Qon`
tribution to the rise of populism, while noting that there is, in
fact, a form of media populism that shapes the political realm
where populists thrive. Part II will focus on the impact, or po-
tential impact, of the current form of populism on democracy,
human rights, and the international law notion of accountabil-
ity. Part III will then discuss the relationship between populism
and the justice system in areas such as penal law and the ques-
tion of whether the death penalty should be retained. Finally,
Part IV will explore whether there is an international law obli-
gation on states to exclude from public office a populist candi-
date who promises, or plans to violate, a norm of customary in-
ternational law, or that which is part of jus cogens. This Part will
also examine the potential conflict between states international
5. See Roth, supra note 2, at 4, 5; Shirin Sinnar, Human Rights, National
Security, and the Role of Lawyers in the Resistance, 13 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 37
(2017).
6. SeeG.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1, Convention Against Torture andOther Cruel,
Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984); see also
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
7. See Sapa-AFP, Keep Your Pink Nose Out, Mugabe Tells US, IOL NEWS
(July 19, 2013, 06:48AM); eNews Channel, Julius Malema Insults BBC Jour-
nalist, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uj35x73sIVA.
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obligations when dealing with certain populists and their right
to participate in an election and the right to vote.
I. DEFINITION, RISE, AND CAUSES OF POPULISM
This Part will discuss the definition of populism that will be
used throughout the article. It will also articulate the factors
that have influenced its rise in recent years.
A. Definition of Populism
RotjitJstanOinL Z'anQisQo :anigga’sjo'Os tJat it Jas leQome
7a QHiQJk to sta't j'itinL on *o*&Hism lh HamentinL tJe HaQk oM
QHa'ith alo&t tJe QonQe*tb58 one must start by mentioning that
although there has been an over-use of the term populism—with
scholars like Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Kaltwasser recognizing
it as 7one oM tJe main *oHitiQaH l&ggjo'Os oM tJe EGst Qent&'h59—
there is no agreed upon definition. Ivan Krastev, a well-known
anaHhst oM OemoQ'aQhb Jas e%en 'eMe''eO to tJis as 7tJe aLe oM
po*&Hismb510 where the main political question may as well be
7Joj a Hile'aH OemoQ'aQh Qan M&nQtion in an en%i'onment in
which the elites [are] permanently mistrusted, regardless of
what they do or how transparent the mechanisms of governing
a'e^511 Yet, no one can provide a definition of populism that is
agreeable to everyone.
In current debates, the definition of populism is further obfus-
cated where the term is used not only to refer to demagoguery,
but also by commentators and politicians for their own conven-
ience.12 In this sense, Jan-Werner Muller has noted that many
timesb tJe te'm 7*o*&Hism5 is HooseHh &seO as a 7shnonhm Mo'
3anti-estalHisJment’ i''es*eQti%eb it seemsb oM anh *oHitiQaH
iOeas^513 Thus, for example, both Donald Trump and Bernie
8. Francisco Panizza, Introduction: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy,
in FRANCISCO PANIZZA, POPULISM AND THEMIRROR OFDEMOCRACY 1 (2005).
9. CASMUDDE&CRISTÓBAL ROVIRAKALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 1 (2017).
10. Ivan Krastev, The Age of Populism: Reflections on the Self-Enmity of De-
mocracy, 10 EUR. VIEW, at 11, 13 (2011).
11. Id.
12. JAN-WERNERMULLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 1 (2016).
13. Id. at 2.
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Sanders were referred to as populists during the U.S. presiden-
tial election.14 To those who would immediately protest the cat-
egorization of Bernie Sanders as a populist, such a rejection is
largely premised on their view that Sanders is a good man.
Based on their understanding, a populist is a bad politician—
maybe someone like Donald Trump, Robert Mugabe, or Recep
6ahhi* ['OoCan^ qetb in anh OemoQ'aQh jJe'e HeaOe'sJi* is Oe`
cided by an election, it may be difficult to decide which politician
is populist and which one is not, since every politician aspires to
identify with the causes and grievances of the populace, or at
least, to sympathize with people from whom he or she expects
votes from. These difficulties have led Jan-Werner Muller to ask
whether a populist is simply 7a s&QQessM&H *oHitiQian tJat one
Ooesn’t Hike^515 8imiHa'Hhb :JiHi**e 8QJmitte' Jas noteO tJat 7to
le QaHHeO a 3*o*&Hist’ is to le ins&HteO anOb iM *ossilHeb eiQH&OeO
M'om 3'es*eQtalHe’ Hile'aH OemoQ'atiQ *'aQtiQe^516 It is to no won-
der why Cas Mudde has commenteO tJat tJe 7te'm *o*&Hism is
oMten asQ'ileO to *oHitiQiansb l&t seHOom QHaimeO lh tJem^517
In general, when one thinks of a populist, one thinks of an
7emotionaH5 *oHitiQian jJo is anti-elitism and establishment.18
Yet, criticizing the elite, or those who are in power, may consti-
tute a characteristic of a populist, which does not alone qualify
one as a populist.19 For the purposes of this article, populism re-
fers to the politics of leaders who are anti-elites, anti-pluralist,
and who hold a firm belief tJat 7tJeh aHone 'e*'esent tJe *eo`
*He^520 Due to this belief, anyone who challenges a populist is
seen as QJaHHenLinL 7tJe *eo*He^521 It is in line with this under-
stanOinL tJat tJe :'esiOent oM 6&'kehb 9eQe* 6ahhi* ['OoCanb
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Philippe Schmitter, A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of Popu-
lisms, 7 ROMANIAN J. POL. SCI. 5 (2007).
17. Cas Mudde, Are Populists Friends or Foes of Constitutionalism?, FOUND.
L. JUST. & SOC’Y at 1, 2 (2013).
18. MULLER, supra note 12, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3.
21. See Jason Burke, Kenyan Supreme Court Annuls Uhuru Kenyatta Elec-
tion Victory, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2017/sep/01/kenyan-supreme-court-annuls-uhuru-kenyatta-
election-victory.
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in challenging his opponents, askeO< 7[w]e are the people, who
a'e ho&"522
In consideration of some of the abovementioned points, Cas
Mudde has defined populism as follow:
[Populism is] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic g'o&*sb 3tJe
*&'e *eo*He’ %e's&s 3tJe Qo''&*t eHite’b anO jJiQJ a'L&es tJat
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (gen-
eral will) of the people. Populism, so defined, has two opposites:
elitism and pluralism.23
Many scholars have embraced M&OOe’s OeMinitionb notinL *o*`
&Hism as *oHitiQs oM 7tJem %e's&s &sb5 jJe'e tJe Qommon *oo'
people fight the elite or those perceived as the corrupt elite. Fur-
thermore, while noting the absence of an agreed upon definition
of populism, Özgür Gökmen has stated that a consideration of
tJ'ee (&estionsb nameHh# 7WJo a'e tJe *eo*He"5 7WJo s*eaks Mo'
tJe *eo*He"5 7Xoj Ooes *o*&Hist iOentiMiQation oQQ&'"5 Qan le Ois`
Qe'neO M'om Cas S&OOe’s OeMinition^24 Answers to these three
questions show that there is a considerable degree of consensus
among scholars regarding what populist politics entail.25 In ex-
plaining populist politics in the realm of the above questions,
Jan-Werner Muller has noted the following:
[Their] claim to representation [of the people] is not an empir-
ical one; it is always distinctly moral. When running for office,
populists portray their political competitors as part of the im-
moral, corrupt elite; when ruling, they refuse to recognise any
opposition as legitimate. The populist logic also implies that
whoever does not support populist parties might not be a
proper part of the people—always defined as the righteous and
morally pure. Put simply, populists do not claim ‘we are the 99
percent.’ What they imply instead is ‘we are the 100 percent^’ Zo'
populists, this equation always works out: any remainder can
be dismissed as immoral and not properly a part of the people
22. Jan-Werner Müller, Trump, Erdoğan, Farge: The Attractions of Popu-
lism for Politicians, The Dangers of Democracy, GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/sep/02/trump-erdogan-farage-the-
attractions-of-populism-for-politicians-the-dangers-for-democracy.
23. Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 39 GOV’T AND OPPOSITION 541, 543
(2004); see also Özgür, supra note 1, at 3.
24. Mudde, supra note 23, at 543.
25. Özgür, supra note 1, at 3.
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at all. That’s another way of saying that populism is always a
form of identity politics.26
Such perceptions on who constitutes the people may as well be
Q'itiQigeO^ 6Je te'm 7tJe *eo*He5 in moOe'n Oah OemoQ'aQies is a
plural construct of persons from diverse backgrounds and cul-
tures. The failure of populist leaders to realize this fact presents
a problem from the beginning.
In addition to the observation that populism is a form of iden-
tity politics, it has been argued elsewhere27 that the current form
of populism constitutes a politics of scapegoating. In Europe and
Ame'iQab *o*&Hists a'e 7(&iQk to iOentiMh immiL'antsb 'eHiLio&s
minorities, refugees, foreign aid recipients, and the liberal es-
talHisJment as tJe *'olHem^528 In Africa, many African populists
point to Western countries, white people, colonialism, and neo-
colonialism as the source of their problems, excusing their own
failed leadership.29 To some degree, it is true that the current
form of populism—especially in the United States—is, in fact,
demagoguery. It is to that end that Marcelo Alegre has noted
tJat in E\G?b 7OemaLoL&e'h OeMines tJe *o*&Hist a**'oaQJb jitJ
the infantilization of the electorate, the poisoning of public de-
lateb anO an olsessi%e JeLemoniQ amlition^530
B. Factors Responsible for the Populist Wave
Having provided a definition of populism and an explanation
of what it entails, this subpart will briefly discuss some of the
factors that have contributed to the rise of populism in recent
years. Various scholars have already articulated the causes of
26. MULLER, supra note 12, at 3 (emphasis added); see also Özgür, supra
note 1, at 3.
27. Thompson Chengeta, African Populist Demagoguery, Constitutionalism
and Human Rights, AFR. J. OF COMP. L. 8 (forthcoming 2017); see also
Schmitter, supra note 16, at 6.
28. Stephen Hopgood, Fascism Rising, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/stephen-hopgood/fascism-
rising.
29. See HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 398
(Pauline Dixon et al. eds., 2015); JULIAN MORRIS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
59 (2011); GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 4 (2006).
30. Marcelo Alegre, Populism and Human Rights: Oil and Water?, SELA
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 3 (2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/kamel/sela16_alegre_cv_eng.pdf.
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populism.31 Thomas Greven has noted that an array of political,
economic, social, and cultural discontentment has led to the rise
of the current wave of populism.32
Of the economic causes, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart
have noted that economic insecurity among certain citizens in
America and Europe is contributing to negative populism.33 Not
only are many citizens economically insecure, but they feel so-
cially deprived and left behind in modern economy.34 The so
QaHHeO 7HeMt-leJinOs5 o' 7Hess seQ&'e st'ata oM soQieth5— com-
prised mostly of unemployed, low-wage, unskilled, generally
poor, and uneducated populations—have started to resent polit-
iQaH QHasses anO 7eHite *oHitiQiansb5 jJom tJeh leHie%e a'e not *'o`
tecting them from the immigrants they blame for unemploy-
ment, shrinking opportunities, and scarce resources.35
6Je alo%ementioneO eQonomiQ OisQontentment Jas HeO to 7tJe
anti-establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering
ei*HoiteO lh *o*&Hist mo%ementsb *a'tiesb anO HeaOe's^536 Essen-
tiaHHhb *oHitiQs Jas leQome tJe st'&LLHe oM 7tJem5 %e's&s 7&s^537
The disgruntled citizens find hope in populists and demagogues,
who promise to address their economic grievances.38 The appeal
oM *o*&Hist HeaOe's to soQieth’s 7HeMt-leJinOsb5 in te'ms oM tJe
modern economy and the control of the means of production, has
been well captured by Steven Hopgood as follows:
31. See Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash (Harv. Kennedy School
Fac. Res. Working Paper Series 2, 2016).
32. Thomas Greven, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the
United States: A Comparative Perspective, FRIEDRICH-EBERT STIFTUNG 4
(2016), http://www.fesdc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/Rightwing-
Populism.pdf.
33. See Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.; see also 8enem AhOPn-Düzgit & Fuat Keyman, The Trump Presi-
dency and the Rise of Populism in the Global Context, ISTANBUL POL’Y CTR. 4
(2017), http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/The-Trump-
Presidency-and-the-Rise-of-Populism-in-the-Global-Context.pdf.
36. Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31; see also Ewen Speed & Russell
Mannion, The Rise of Post-Truth Populism in Pluralist Liberal Democracies:
Challenges for Health Policy, 6 INT’L J. HEALTHPOL’Y&MGMT. 249, 250 (2017).
37. Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31; see also Panizza, supra note 8, at 8;
Stephen Coleman & Karen Ross, The Media and The Public: “Them” and “Us”
in Media Discourse, J. MEDIA&COMM. RES. 177 (2010) (book review).
38. Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31.
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Is this how it begins? With rage, with the demands of the enti-
tled millions who feel their birth right has been stolen, with
tJose jJo QHaim 3je l&iHt tJis Qo&nt'hb je Mo&LJt its ja'sb
jJen is it o&' t&'n"’ ronaHO 6'&m* ^ ^ ^ is tJe stanOa'O lea'e'
for an increasingly familiar social coalition, angry white work-
ing-class men (and women) with weak formal education and
weaker job prospects, along with disaffected white middle-class
conservatives, many of them religious, who are furious that
they lost the cultu'e ja's^ We’%e seen tJis QoaHition leMo'e< it’s
a breeding ground for fascism.39
Likewise, Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rappor-
teur on extreme poverty and human rights, has noted that the
failure of the human rights corpus to effectively champion socio-
economic rights with the same rigour as it does civil and political
'iLJts Jas *HaheO a 'oHe in tJe Q'eation oM tJe 7HeMt-leJinOsb5 M'om
which populists draw their supporters.40 Wt is tJis 7Q&''ent QJoiQe
whereby civil and political rights are privileged and economic
and social rights are all but ignored [which just] works fine for
tJe eHites541—the ones that are identified as the enemy by popu-
lists and their supporters. Alston notes that the human rights
project may have been able to prevent some of the effects of pop-
ulism if it had been all encompassing to the citizens of the
world.42 Yet, human rights and its related institutions have
largely been understood as only serving the minorities and the
disadvantaged, leaving behind those who are perceived to be
well-off. In that regard, people like Philip Alston—the elderly
white males—are considered to be well-off and not in need of any
JeH*^ AQQo'OinL to AHstonb Joje%e'b 7tJe 'eaHith is tJat tJe ma`
jority in society feel that they have no stake in the human rights
enterprise, and that human rights groups really are just work-
inL Mo' 3ashH&m seeke'sb’ 3MeHonsb’ 3te''o'istsb’ anO tJe Hike^543
In the United States, those who have been feeling left out are
likely the ones who voted for Donald Trump.44 Thus, within the
7HeMt-leJinOs5 s*eQt'&mb tJe'e a'e tJose jJo a'e eQonomiQaHHh
39. Hopgood, supra note 28.
40. Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31.
41. Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTS.
PRAC.1, 9 (2017).
42. Id. at 4, 6.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Ron Dudai, Human Rights in the Populist Era: Mourn then (Re)Organ-
ize, 9 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 16, 19 (2017).
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disadvantaged and those who feel human rights is not vigorous
enough to vindicate their economic rights, thus tolerating eco-
nomic powerlessness and oppression, while embracing economic
dictators who feel excluded from the human rights project and
governmental policies because of the assumption that they do
not need any help. Makau Mutua has strongly criticized the hu-
man rights doctrine for ignoring economic powerlessness, espe-
cially on the African continent, stating that:
Fundamentally, the human rights corpus has no philosophy on
money and whether, for example, the creation of a Bill Gates
would itself be a violation of human rights norms. In political
society, an absolute dictator would be impermissible under hu-
man rights norms and contemporary understanding of political
democracy. Analogously, Bill Gates is the market equivalent of
the political dictator although that is not how he is understood
in a political democracy or by the human rights corpus. In fact,
Gates is a celebrated and venerated individual, the pinnacle of
success in society. Yet the existence of his economic empire,
which he holds personally, is a radical perversion of any egali-
tarian or equitable notions of human dignity. . . . The multipli-
cation of Gates by the number of other obscenely rich individ-
uals and corporate interests yields a graphic over-concentra-
tion of power in the hands of a tiny majority. It is very difficult,
if not impossible, to articulate a plausible argument of how a
system that permits such vast differences among citizens does
not violate basic notions of human dignity. The corpus must
develop a defensible normative project to address economic and
social arrangements and systems. . . . The human rights move-
ment’s primary grounding and bias toward civil and political
rights—and the impotence and vagueness of economic, social
and cultural rights—is one of its major weaknesses . . . [h]uman
rights corpus wrongly equates the containment of state despot-
ism with the achievement of human dignity, so that it seeks the
construction of a political society in which political tyranny—
not economic tyranny—is circumscribed. But in so doing it side-
steps economic powerlessness—the very condition that must be
addressed. . . .45
Of course, economic factors are closely related to political fac-
tors that have been contributing to the current wave of popu-
lism. For example, Peter Hall has observed that the current form
45. SeeMakauMutua,Human Rights in Africa: The Limited Promise of Lib-
eralism, 51 AFR. STUD. REV. 17, 31N32, 34, 35 (2008) (emphasis added).
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oM *o*&Hism 7Jas *oHitiQaH 'oots in tJe Qon%e'LenQe oM *a'th *lat-
forms—no one is HisteninL to &s5—essentially, there is no one to
tell of economic, political, social, or cultural problems.46
Nevertheless, in the political realm, security threats have
made it easy for populists to claim that governments are failing
to protect their own people.47 X&man 9iLJts WatQJ’s [ieQ&ti%e
Director, Kenneth Roth, has indicated that the current form of
populism—in particular, that which is fueled by Islamophobia—
is a result of global terrorism, migration, and the influx of refu-
gees.48 TJe Mea' oM te''o'ists anO immiL'ants Jas HeO to 7LHolaH
attacks on human rights^549 Today, the common mantra of dem-
agogues is that human rights norms are essentially a stumbling
block for governmental efforts to defend citizens from terrorist
threats.50 It is in this sense that Philip Alston has also observed
that the horrendous September 11th attack on the United States
Jas Q'eateO 7an aQt&aH o' Qonst'&QteO Mea' anO Jat'eO oM Mo'eiLn`
e's o' mino'itiesb551 which populist leaders exploit for their own
political gain.52 After September 11th, many people in the
4niteO 8tatesb anO aQ'oss tJe LHoleb 7a'e noj jiOeHh Qon%inQeO
that security can only be achieved through making enormous
trade-offs, whether in terms of freedom of movement, privacy,
non-discrimination norms, or even personal integrity guaran-
tees^553
46. Peter A. Hall, Six Theses About Contemporary Populism, Presentation
at the Harvard University GEM Conference 7 (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://gem.cid.harvard.edu/files/gem2016/files/hall_blyth_berglof_gem17.pdf.
47. See Roth, supra note 2, at 1.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also RIKKE ANDREASSEN & KATHRINE VITUS, AFFECTIVITY AND
RACE: STUDIES FROM NORDIC CONTEXTS 24 (2016); BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE
GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM: PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND
REPRESENTATION 127 (2016); MARC ROSENBLUM & DANIEL TICHENOR, THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 12 (2012);
CHARLES CLARKE, THE EU AND MIGRATION: A CALL FOR ACTION 1, 2 (2011),
http://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/essay/2011/eu-and-migration-call-ac-
tion.
50. Roth, supra note 2; see also PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 390 (2013); RUSSELL ONG, CHINA’S SECURITY
INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLDWARERA 124 (2013).
51. Alston, supra note 41, at 4.
52. Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31.
53. Alston, supra note 41, at 4.
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There are also scholars who have explained the rise of current
*o*&Hism in jJat is te'meO tJe 7Q&Ht&'aH laQkHasJ tJesis^554
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have argued that the current
populist wave is a reaction lh nationaHistiQ Qitigens aLainst 7*'o`
L'essi%e Q&Ht&'aH QJanLe^555 They argue that international
norms—such as human rights—Ja%e 'es&HteO in a 7siHent 'e%o`
H&tion5 tJat Jas seen 7an inte'Lene'ationaH sJiMt toja'O *ost-
materialist values, such as cosmopolitanism and multicultural-
ism^556 In essence, certain privileges, cultural perceptions, and
identities have been eroded, causing great discomfort in certain
parts of populations.57 Those who are disgruntled are, therefore,
launching a counter-revolution in the name of populism. It is in
the view of that perceived cultural erosion that most of the man-
t'as oM *o*&Hists Ja%e 7QHeansinL5 Qonnotations o' 'esto'ati%e
o%e'tones^ Zo' eiam*Heb jJiHe :'esiOent 6'&m*’s mant'a jas
7make Ame'iQa L'eat aLainb5 s&**o'te's oM !'eiit QJanteO 7je
jant o&' Qo&nt'h laQk^558 Similar sentiments are present in Af-
rican populism that are anti-Western, with African populists ar-
L&inL Mo' 7AM'iQan soH&tions to AM'iQan *'olHems^559
There is an obvious overlap of the abovementioned factors. In
order to gain the support of the electorate, politicians capitalize
on the prejudices of the populace, attacking political leadership
that is condemned as corrupt and elitist, while at the same time,
encouraging a belief that economic stagnation, crime, and secu-
rity threats are the effects of migration, which governments are
failing to deal with.60 All of these issues subsequently play out
in the media.
54. Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id.; see also BRENDONO’CONNOR, A POLITICALHISTORY OF THEAMERICAN
WELFARE SYSTEM: WHEN IDEASHAVECONSEQUENCES 159 (2004).
57. Norris & Inglehart, supra note 31, at 13N16.
58. MULLER, supra note 12, at 38; WILLIAM OUTHWAITE, BREXIT:
SOCIOLOGICAL RESPONSES 91 (2017); HARRY MOUNT, SUMMER MADNESS: HOW
BREXIT SPLIT THE TORIES, DESTROYED LABOUR AND DIVIDED THE COUNTRY 13
(2017).
59. LEO PANITCH & GREG ALBO, THE POLITICS OF THE RIGHT: SOCIALIST
REGISTER 2016, 207 (2015); GUYMARTIN, AFRICANPOLITICALTHOUGHT 8 (2012).
60. EXPOSING THE DEMAGOGUES: RIGHT-WING AND NATIONAL POPULIST
PARTIES IN EUROPE 1, 96, 346, 359 (Karsten Grabow & Florian Hartleb eds.,
2013).
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C. The Role of the Media
The media—in particular, social media—has played a very sig-
nificant role in the rise of populism.61 Using case studies from
four countries, Sven Engesser and others came to the conclusion
tJat 7soQiaH meOia Li%es tJe *o*&Hist aQto's tJe M'eeOom to a'tiQ`
&Hate tJei' iOeoHoLh anO s*'eaO tJei'messaLes^562 Through plat-
forms such as Facebookb *o*&Hists a'e alHe to 7s*'eaO a M'aL`
menteO iOeoHoLh5 oM *o*&Hism tJat is *'esenteO as tJe onHh soH&`
tion to the disgruntled populace.63
A number of news media outlets have jumped on the populist
bandwagon, giving populist leaders much needed media cover-
age.64 Just as much as terrorists use social media to disseminate
their propaganda,65 populists leaders employ social media for
sensationalism, playing on the feelings of their targeted audi-
ences.66 More often, populists paint an apocalyptic image, reck-
oning that if something is not done to unseat current leadership
more interested in the rights of terrorists and immigrants than
the welfare of its citizens, there will be nothing left for the na-
tives and their children.67 In that regard, Cesare Pinelli has ar-
gued that in the contemporary era of populism, most citizens ex-
*e'ienQe *oHitiQs tJ'o&LJ tJe ehes anO ea's oM tJe meOiab 7I&OL`
inL *oHitiQians M'om aMa' anO tJ'o&LJ Oisto'teO Hensb5 'es&HtinL
in 7OisenQJantmentb e%en Jat'eOb oM *oHitiQs anO *oHitiQians^568
61. See MUDDE&KALTWASSER, supra note 9, at 114; TORIL AALBERG ET AL.,
POPULIST POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE 378 (2016); MARIA RANIERI,
POPULISM, MEDIA AND EDUCATION: CHALLENGING DISCRIMINATION IN
CONTEMPORARYDIGITAL SOCIETIES (2016).
62. Sven Engesser et al., Populism and Social Media: How Politicians
Spread A Fragmented Ideology, 20 ROUTLEDGE INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 1, 1
(2016). See generally COUNTERPOINT, SHAPING THE VOTE? POPULISM AND
POLITICS IN THE MEDIA (2015), http://counterpoint.uk.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/04/counterpoint_compilation_010415.pdf.
63. Engesser et al., supra note 62, at 1.
64. AALBERG ET AL., supra note 61.
65. SIDDIK EKICI ET AL., COUNTERING TERRORIST RECRUITMENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF ARMEDCOUNTER-TERRORISMOPERATIONS 89 (2016).
66. MARGARET ROBERTSON & PO TSANG, EVERYDAY KNOWLEDGE, EDUCATION
AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURES: TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION 110 (2016).
67. See generally IMRAN AWAN, ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CYBERSPACE: HATE CRIMES
GOVIRAL (2016).
68. Cesare Pinelli, The Populist Challenge to Constitutional Democracy, 7
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 5, 7 (2011).
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In addition, Gianpietro Mazzoleni has noted that there is a
mutual influence between the media and the current form of
populism.69 In fact, he distinguishes between elite media and
populist media. In the realm of media populism, somemedia out-
Hets 7*'o%iOe shm*atJetic coverage to neo-*o*&Hist mo%ementsb5
jJe'e tJeh MoQ&s on tJe 7*e'sonaHith t'aits oM *oHitiQaH aQto'sb on
entertainment values, or on the details of conflicts, rather at the
He%eH oM Lossi*b tJan at tJe He%eH oM se'io&s anaHhsis^570 This ap-
proach to populism, and its manner of reporting, has helped the
populist agenda capture the attention of those who may have
needed just a little persuasion to join the populist cause.
While it is true that the media cannot ignore what is newswor-
thy, the populistic media treats as most newsworthy those pop-
&Hists jJo a'e 7OeMhinL tJe eiistinL o'Oe'b tJei' al'asi%e Han`
guage, their public protests, and the emotive issues brandished
lh QJa'ismatiQ HeaOe's^571 In some cases, even the mainstream
media covers such news intentionally or unintentionally, giving
populist leaders much needed media coverage. One of the major
problems with repeated coverage is that it normalizes what so-
ciety may have already rejected as bigotry. Populists are also
given a platform to attack the mainstream media that criticizes
tJem^ 8&QJ meOia is QonOemneO as 7eHitist5 o' jJat ronaHO
6'&m* Jas O&lleO 7Make nejs^572 In that regard, Alexandra
WiHts Jas olse'%eO tJat :'esiOent ronaHO 6'&m* is 7shstemati`
cally trying to delegitimize the news as an institution because
tJeh jon’t Qo%e' Jim tJe jah Je jants to le Qo%e'eO^573 The ac-
tions of Donald Trump are deliberate, as 7Je’s aQti%eHh *'o%okinL
69. See Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Media e populismo: Alleati o nemici?,
UNIVERSITÀDEGLI STUDI 1 (Working Papers del Dipartimento di Milano, No. 4,
2004), http://www.sociol.unimi.it/papers/2004-3-3_Gianpietro%20Maz-
zoleni.pdf; see also Nicole Ernst, Understanding Media Populism: An Interna-
tional and Intermedia Comparison, NCCR DEMOCRACY 5 (2014),
http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/intranet/doctoral_program/main/academic-
program/compulsory-program-1/research-colloquium-1/papers-to-be-pre-
sented-18-september/ernst_nicole.pdf/.
70. Mazzoleni, supra note 69.
71. Id.
72. Haley Britzky, Everything Trump Has Called 7FAKE NEWS,5 AXIOS
(July 9, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-outlets-and-topics-trump-deems-
fake-news-2449858042.html.
73. Alexandra Wilts, Trump Calling Stories He Doesn’t Like ‘Fake News’ is
Akin to State-Run Media, INDEP. (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:59 PM), http://www.inde-
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*eo*He to Oist'&st tJe nejsb to Oist'&st inMo'mation tJat Ooesn’t
come from him. This is what demagogues and despots do.574
Likewise, during his time in power, Robert Mugabe victimized
all media houses75 that did not support his propaganda, while
only tolerating those which painted him as the Messiah of Zim-
babwe.76
It can be argued, however, that while the media plays, or con-
tinues to play, a role in the rise of populism, the contribution of
the media is dependent on several factors, such as whether the
targeted audience already agrees with the position or state-
ments by populists which, in most instances, are characterized
by bigotry.
II. POPULISM ANDHUMAN RIGHTS
Having discussed some of the factors contributing to the rise
of populism and the role played by the media, this Part will
discuss the implication of populism on democracy, human rights,
and constitutionalism. Of course, the reason for considering the
impact of populism on democracy is premised on the old
argument that democracy is one of the preconditions for the
enjoyment of human rights.77
A. Populism, Liberal Democracy, and Human Rights
Many scholars have written on the impact of populism on lib-
eral democracy. The question of whether populism can be recon-
ciled with liberal democracy appears to be paradoxical because,
in any democracy, the idea of appealing to the popular will and
protecting their interests is not unimaginable. After all, a politi-
Qian’s *o*&Ha'ith in Jis o' Je' Qonstit&enQh is a *'eQonOition oM
pendent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-fake-news-face-
book-real-news-state-run-tom-rosenstiel-american-press-institute-
a7886671.html.
74. Id.
75. See Zim Court Scraps Daily News Ban, MAIL & GUARDIAN, (Mar. 14,
2005, 12:59 PM), https://mg.co.za/article/2005-03-14-zim-court-scraps-daily-
news-ban.
76. See FRANCIS MACHINGURA, THE MESSIANIC FEEDING OF THE MASSES: AN
ANALYSIS OF JOHN 6 IN THE CONTEXT OF MESSIANIC LEADERSHIP IN POST-
COLONIAL ZIMBABWE 220 (2012).
77. See U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY: THE 2011 FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE REPORT 118
(2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/35439/hrd-report-2011.pdf.
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him or her winning elections. It is in that sense that Felix Onyi-
ego, in his defence of Tanzanian President, John Magufuli, who
was 7aQQ&seO5 oM leinL a *o*&Histb a'L&eO tJat 7SaL&M&Hi is not
a *o*&Hist l&t sim*Hh a *o*&Ha' *'esiOent^578
While there may be no agreement on the definition of popu-
lism, most scholars commenting on the subject agree that popu-
lism, especially in its current Mo'mb is 7a 3OemoQ'atiQ Oiso'Oe'b’ a
3*atJoHoLh oM OemoQ'aQhb’ anO a 3*a'anoiO sthHe oM *oHitiQs^’579 Be-
fore explaining further why populist politics is hard—if not im-
possible—to reconcile with liberal democracy, it is worthwhile to
start by noting the views of scholars like Philippe Schmitter,
who argue that there are some virtues of populism which are in
the interest of democracy.80 For example, he claims that since
*o*&Hists O'aj tJei' 7s&**o't aQ'oss o' jitJ Ois'eLa'O Mo' tJe
lines of cleavage that are embodied in existing political for-
mationsb581 it means that they can do away with sclerotic parti-
sanship and disintegrate collusive party systems that are not
good for liberal democracy.82 Furthermore, because populists ap-
peal to neglected issues and grievances oM tJe 7HeMt-leJinOsb5
they have a *otentiaH oM LettinL tJe 7aHooM Qitigens5 to *a'tiQi*ate
in the electoral process—which is essential for any democracy.83
For that reason, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser has suggested fur-
ther empirical investigations into populism, on the basis that
populism may turn out to be corrective to democracy.84
Now that populism can find its roots in the democracy theory,
Ivan Krastev Jas OesQ'ileO tJe Q&''ent Mo'm oM *o*&Hism as 7tJe
self-enmith oM OemoQ'aQh^585 It is for that stronger reason that
launching a critique against a populist leader is not always easy,
unless the leader patently engages in bigotry and demagoguery.
In explaining populism as an enemy of democracy that attacks
from within, Jan-Werner Muller has commented as follows:
78. Felix Onyiego,Magufuli Not a Populist But Simply a Popular President,
DAILYNATION (Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Letters/Magufuli-
not-a-populist-but-simply-a-popular-president/440806-3426540-12vnt8t/.
79. Mudde, supra note 17, at 3.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See generally MUDDE&KALTWASSER, supra note 9.
85. Krastev, supra note 10, at 11.
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The danger to democracy today is not some comprehensive ide-
ology that systematically denies democratic ideals. The danger
is populism—a degraded form of democracy that promises to
make LooO on OemoQ'aQh’s JiLJest iOeaHs f3Het tJe *eo*He '&He2’d^
The danger comes, in other words, from within the democratic
world—the political actors posing the danger speak the lan-
guage of democratic values.86
One of the main reasons why the current form of populism can-
not le 'eQonQiHeO jitJ OemoQ'aQh is tJat it is 7an exclusionary
Mo'm oM iOentith *oHitiQs5 tJat is o**oseO to tJe M&nOamentaH ten`
ets oM OemoQ'aQh tJat 7'e(&i'es *H&'aHism anO tJe 'eQoLnition
that we need to find fair terms of living together as free, equal,
l&t aHso i''eO&QilHh Oi%e'se Qitigens^587 Thus, in view of the divi-
si%e nat&'e oM *o*&Hist *oHitiQsb :ete' XaHH Jas a'L&eO tJat it 7&n`
dermines the tolerance and solidarity essential for well-function-
inL OemoQ'aQh^588
There is no doubt that democracy thrives when there is a rep-
resentative system that guarantees the rights of both the major-
ity and the minority. Yet, populist politics may not accommodate
or function well within representative systems. To this end, it
has long been observed that representative systems are neces-
sary for their purposes of protectinL Qitigens M'om 7tem*o'a'h e'`
rors and delusions [that are] stimulated by some irregular pas-
sion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepre-
sentations of interested men, [who] may call for measures which
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
QonOemn^589 To balance the interests of the majority and those
of the minority, liberal democracy is characterized by majoritar-
ian and non-majoritarian institutions—for example, elected
members of parliament and non-elected judges in the judiciary.90
qetb 7*o*&Hists QHaim tJat :a'Hiament is tJe soHe HeLitimate a&`
tJo'ith to le oleheO in a OemoQ'aQh5 anO, as s&QJb 7attaQk non-
majoritarian institutions on the ground of their lack of demo-
Q'atiQ HeLitimaQh^591 It is along these lines tJat Uenha’s :'esi`
dent, Uhuru Kenyatta stated, after the Supreme Court of Kenya
86. MULLER, supra note 12, at 6.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Hall, supra note 46, at 9.
89. See DENNISMUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 192 (1996).
90. DANIELA PREDA & DANIELE PASQUINUCCI, THE ROAD EUROPE TRAVELLED
ALONG: THEEVOLUTION OF THEEEC/EU INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 295 (2010).
91. Pinelli, supra note 68, at 15.
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annulled the 2017 presidential elections on the grounds that
tJe'e je'e eHeQto'aH i''eL&Ha'ities< 7W OisaL'ee jitJ it otJe 8&`
preme Court decision] because, as I have said, millions of Ken-
yans queued, made their choice and six people, [the judges], have
OeQiOeO tJat tJeh jiHH Lo aLainst tJe jiHH oM tJe *eo*He^592
The development and refinement of liberal democracy has seen
the emergence and strengthening of certain political procedures
and limitations that are essential in governance. Yet, as ob-
served by Paul Blokker, populists consider the proceduralism of
liberal democracy to be not only cumbersome and artificial, but
also a constraint on the true political will of the people.93 In fact,
as indicated by Nadia Urbinati, populists prefer unmediated re-
lations between leaders and the citizens.94 In arguing that de-
mocracy cannot survive under populist governments, Marcelo
Alegre notes that *o*&Hism is QJa'aQte'igeO lh an 7eiaQe'lation
of personalistic leaderships [and] dynastic governments seeking
to *e'*et&ate in *oje'^595 Along the same lines, it has been
noted that in populist politics, the populist leader is in a way
7tJe *eo*He,5 sinQe tJe L'ie%anQes anO &nM&HMiHHeO OemanOs oM tJe
grou* tJat iOentiMies itseHM as 7tJe *eo*He5 Q'hstaHHise 7a'o&nO tJe
name oM *o*&Ha' HeaOe's^596 In most cases, such populistic gov-
ernments are characterized by official propaganda that demon-
izes opposition and discourages criticism of the government, ul-
timately undermining the tenets of constitutional democracy.97
The kind of populism that produces eternal leaders is most evi-
dent in Africa, where it has destroyed many democracies with
leaders like Robert Mugabe, who ruled for more than thirty-
seven years.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Patricia Chiantera-Stutte
Jas QonQH&OeO tJat *o*&Hism is 7a *oHitiQaH sthHe jJiQJ aims at
92. Felix Njini & Michael Cohen, Kenyan Court Nullifies President Ken-
yatta’s Election Victory, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-01/kenya-s-top-court-nulli-
fies-president-kenyatta-s-election-winhttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-09-01/kenya-s-top-court-nullifies-president-kenyatta-s-election-win.
93. Paul Blokker, Populist Constitutionalism, I-CONNECT (May 4, 2017),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/05/populist-constitutionalism/.
94. Nadia Urbinati, Democracy and Populism, 5 CONSTELLATIONS 110, 116
(1998).
95. Alegre, supra note 30.
96. See ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 192 (2005).
97. Alegre, supra note 30, at 4.
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attaQkinL tJe Qent'e oM tJe OemoQ'atiQ shstem^598 If populism
cannot be reconciled with democracy, it is likely that it cannot
be in the interests of human rights. Vijay Nagaraj has indicated
that when considering the relationship between human rights,
international human rights law, and its institutions, one has to
ask< 7WJat Ja%e *o*&Hist a**'oaQJes to J&man 'iLJts Qost &s"599
That question may be easily answered by considering Philip Al-
ston’s Qomment in 'eHation to tJe Q&''ent Mo'm oM *o*&Hism in
Ame'iQa anO [&'o*eb jJiQJ Je QJa'aQte'iges as 7nationaHistiQb
xenophobic, misogynistic, and explicitly antagonistic to all or
much of the J&man 'iLJts aLenOa^5100Along the same lines, Ken-
neth Roth has noted that populist demagogues paint a picture of
human rights as stumbling blocks to the efforts of the govern-
ment to protect its own citizens.101
From the beginning, a consideration of the above views makes
one agree with Steven Hopgood, who argues that it is impossible
to reconcile populism and human rights.102 In the age of popu-
Hismb OemoQ'aQh is emlattHeOb anO in s&QJ a lattHeb 7J&man
rights are too compromised by their association with the very
liberal elite—exactly the elite that the Putin/Trump/Brexit coa-
lition hates—to le a *'inQi*aH moliHiginL lanne'^5103 For many
*o*&Histsb anO tJei' s&**o'te's aQ'oss tJe LHoleb 7J&man 'iLJts
are a shell game pushed by cosmopolitan liberals to steal the na-
tion ajah M'om its HeLitimateb mainHh jJiteb Jei's^5104 In the
United States, some supporters of Donald Trump argue that
7J&man 'iLJts je'e not Je'aHOs oM a nej e'a oM Mai' sJa'es Mo'
aHH l&t ajah to steaH tJe inJe'itanQe oM 'eaH Ame'iQans^5105 Thus,
98. Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, Populist Use of Memory and Constitutional-
ism: Two Comments, 6 GERMAN L.J. 391, 392 (2005); see also Margaret Cano-
van, Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy, in
DEMOCRACIES AND THE POPULIST CHALLENGE 25 (Yves Surel & Yves Mény eds.,
2000); Yves Surel, The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism, in DEMOCRACIES
AND THE POPULIST CHALLENGE 1 (Yves Surel & Yves Mény eds., 2000).
99. Vijay Nagaraj, Human Rights and Populism: Some More Questions in
Response to Philip Alston, 9, J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 22, 23 (2017).
100. Alston, supra note 41, at 1N2.
101. Roth, supra note 2.
102. Hopgood, supra note 28.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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in the view of many populists, it is no wonder why Marcelo Ale-
gre has indicated that the relationship between the current form
of populism and human rights is similar to oil and water.106
Theoretically, populism threatens the following four aspects of
the foundations of human rights, namely: that human rights are
individualistic and universal, that human rights limit state sov-
ereignty, that human rights are part of a global moral-political
movement, and that human rights have their foundation in the
equal dignity of every human being.107 The naturalistic view that
human rights are inherent to all human beings encompasses the
idea that human rights are individualistic and universal—con-
cepts that can easily clash with some aspects of populistic poli-
tics.108 Human rights notions of individualism and universalism
demand the recognition and protection of persons in their indi-
vidual capacity as humans who are worthy.109
Yet, contrary to the idea that human rights ought to protect
eaQJ *e'son in Jis o' Je' ojn 'iLJtb *o*&Hism 7assiLns moral sta-
tus to supra-individual entities, as the people, the nation, the
QHassb tJe 'aQeb etQ^5110 6J&sb in %iej oM tJe MaQt tJat 7*o*&Hism
rests on a holistic vision, which revolves around the concept of
*eo*Heb5 it is HikeHh tJat *'oteQtion oM *e'sons in their individual
capacity will diminish, or has already been diminishing, with the
election of populist leaders into power.111 Furthermore, most
populistic sentiments challenge the universalistic nature of hu-
man rights in favor of relativism, a notion that threatens minor-
ity rights, like those of the LGBTI communities.112 It is in that
sense tJat Csala 8+nOo' 6alaIOi Jas noteO tJat 7mino'ith
groups are particularly endangered by extremism and populism
106. Alegre, supra note 30.
107. Id. at 12N25.
108. Id. at 13; REIS A.MONTERO, ETHICS OFHUMANRIGHTS 389 (2014).
109. See WILLY MOKA-MUBELO, RECONCILING LAW AND MORALITY IN HUMAN
RIGHTSDISCOURSE: BEYOND THEHABERMASIANACCOUNT OFHUMANRIGHTS 122
(2016).
110. Alegre, supra note 30, at 13. See also B.M. Oomen, A Serious Case of
Strasbourg-Bashing: An Evaluation of the Debates on the Legitimacy of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in the Netherlands, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 407
(2016).
111. Alegre, supra note 30, at 19.
112. HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, 28 (2013),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf.
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because of their strongly nationalist, chauvinist, and xenophobic
QJa'aQte'^5113
With regards to the question of whether populism can be rec-
onciled with the view that human rights has its roots in respect-
ing the equal dignity of every human being,114 it may be that
these two concepts are irreconcilable. It is hard, if not impossi-
ble, to reconcile aspects of populism—those that categorize peo-
*He into tJe 7'eaHmo'aH *eo*He5 anO tJe immo'aH—who by all in-
tentions anO *&'*osesb a'e not 7*eo*He^5 Zo'manh *o*&Hist HeaO`
ers, the fact that someone is an immigrant, is not a national, is
of another religion, or even of a different opinion, presents a
ground to deny that person equal dignity. Human dignity, as un-
Oe'stooO in inte'nationaH J&man 'iLJts Hajb 'eMe's to 7tJe J&`
manith oM a *e'sonb5 a 7J&manith ojJiQJn ei*'esses tJe Qoncep-
tion of a person as an end and rejects viewing her as a mere
means^5115 When populists scapegoat sexual minorities, immi-
grants, people of color, and others, they see them as a mere
means to gaining political power. This is against human dignity,
which has long served as the framework of society.116 It is in that
sense that Aharon Barak has emphasized that the right to dig-
nity must be understood as an important right, stating that it is
7a M'amejo'k 'iLJt anO a motJe' 'iLJtb5 anO aHH tJe otJe' 'iLJts
a'e 7Oa&LJte' 'iLJts tJat LatJe' toLetJe' &nOe' its jinLs^5117
While various scholars have written on dignity as the founda-
tion of human rights,118Aharon Barak goes further, arguing that
dignity is the foundation of society.119 Following some historical
catastrophes—some of which are similar in nature to the current
113. Csaba Sándor Tabajdi, Minorities and Populism, in DEMOCRACY,
POPULISM ANDMINORITYRIGHTS 94 (Hannes Swoboda & Jan Marinus Wiersma
eds., 2008).
114. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 191, 147 (2011); John
Tasioulas, Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
7 (2012).
115. AHARONBARAK, HUMANDIGNITY xxiv (2015).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 156, 160, 252.
118. See generally EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL
VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 25 (2002); JEREMY WALDRON,
DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 13N47 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed. 2012); MICHAEL J.
MEYER & WILLIAM A. PARENT, THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY
AND AMERICAN VALUES 2 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992);
CHRISTOPHERMCCRUDDEN, UNDERSTANDINGHUMANDIGNITY (2013).
119. See BARAK, supra note 115, at 104N105.
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tide of populism—tJe'e Jas leen 7a Qonstit&tionaHigation oM J&`
man OiLnith as a %aH&e o' as a 'iLJt^5120 Not only is dignity un-
derstood as a social value representing positive aspects of man,
such as respect, glory and honour,121 but it is also underpinned
by morals and ethics of humanity.122 When it comes to morals,
ethics, and humanity, populism is hollow.
Many constitutions across the globe contain the right to dig-
nity123 or its constitutional value, which is understood to be
broader than the right to dignity itself.124 In many countries, hu-
man dignity is used for constitutional interpretation, where the
interpretation that is in line with human dignity is always pre-
ferred.125 Likewise, as a foundation of all other rights, human
dignity is a source of limitation to other rights.126 In that sense,
all other rights are protected for the purposes of furthering the
protection of human dignity.127 This would mean that in circum-
stances where dignity clashes with other rights, it is the preser-
vation of human dignity that takes precedence.128 Yet, populism
does not give way to any notion that is short of the will of the
120. Id.
121. See Drucilla Cornell, Bridging the Span Toward Justice: Laurie Acker-
mann and the Ongoing Architectonic of Dignity Jurisprudence, 2008 ACTA
JURIDICA 18 (2008); BARAK, supra note 115, at 3.
122. BARAK, supra note 115, at 5; BETRAM MORRIS, THE DIGNITY OF MAN 57
(1946); Abraham Edel, Humanist Ethics and the Meaning of Human Dignity,
inMORAL PROBLEMS INCONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: ESSAYS INHUMANISTIC ETHICS
227, 233 (Paul Kurtz ed., 1969); Rachel Bayefsky, Dignity, Honour, and Hu-
man Rights: Kant’s Perspective, 41 POLITICAL THEORY 809 (2013); Thomas W.
Platt,Human Dignity and the Conflict of Rights, 2 IDEALISTICSTUD. 174 (1972);
Jeff Malpas, Human Dignity and Human Being, in PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
DIGNITY: A CONVERSATION 19 (Jeff Malpas & Norelle Lickiss eds., 2007); Paulo
C. Carbonari, Human Dignity as a Basic Concept of Ethics and Human Rights,
inDIGNITY ANDHUMANRIGHTS: THE IMPLEMENTATIONOFECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS 35 (Berma K. Goldewijk et al. eds., 2002).
123. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at http://www.ge-
setze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (Ger.); BARAK, supra note 115, at
12.
124. BARAK, supra note 115, at 13.
125. See id. at 69.
126. Id. at 11.
127. ERINDALY, DIGNITYRIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THEWORTH OF
THEHUMAN PERSON 18 (2013).
128. ROBERT ALEXY & JULIAN RIVERS, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
63, 64 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002).
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people. The characterization of populism with bigotry and at-
tacks on othe' *eo*He’s OiLnithb tJe'eMo'eb e'oOes J&man 'iLJts
from its core.
With developments in international human rights law, state
sovereignty has become understood as including the duty of the
state to protect the rights of its citizens.129 If a state fails to do
so—or engages in the violation of such rights—other states can
refuse to respect the sovereignty of that state and intervene to
protect the victims.130 Some commentators regard this approach
as tJe 7LHolaH sQo*e5 oM J&man 'iLJtsb jJe'e 7tJe %ioHation oM J&`
man rights is sufficient cause for legitimate mobilization on a
LHolaH sQaHe^5131 This notion has seen the emergence of norms
such as the Responsibility to Protect.132 Yet, populists have
strong views on nationalism and share strong sentiments
against intervention into otJe' states’ *oHitiQs o' tJei' ojn^ Wt is
in that sense that Marcelo Alegre has noted that the growth in
*o*&Hism jiHH see a 7shstematiQ 'eaMMi'mation oM tJe *'inQi*He oM
non-inte'Me'enQeb5 jJiQJ jiHH 'es&Ht in 7ajeakeneO notion alo&t
the scope of the international system of protection of human
'iLJts^5133
Most of the aforementioned arguments, which postulate that
populism is a threat to human rights, are more directly applica-
ble to civil and political rights. What of socioeconomic rights?
Does populism pose the same threat? Now that it has been indi-
cated above that one of the reasons explaining the rise to power
of many populist leaders and governments is their promise to
remedy the economic grievances of citizens, one would expect
that the policies of populist governments are friendly to socioec-
onomic rights. This, however, may not be the case. During cam-
paigns, many populists claim that they will implement a redis-
tributive policy on the means of production. Case studies in Af-
rica and Latin America have shown that such a redistributive
claim does not materialize into any meaningful achievement
once populists get into power.134 For example, the populist dicta-
129. DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE 4(H) INTERVENTION 86 (2011).
130. Id.
131. Alegre, supra note 30, at 14.
132. Kuwali, supra note 129, at 86.
133. Alegre, supra note 30, at 19.
134. Id. at 6.
422 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:2
tor, President Robert Mugabe, promised economic glory to jus-
tify most of his policies that inte'Me'eO jitJ Qitigens’ 'iLJts^135 In
2000, when his ZANU PF government invaded and seized white
farms without compensation, he claimed that he was acting in
the name of the people of Zimbabwe, and that such farms would
benefit the general populace.136 One of Role't S&Lale’s main
arguments was that white farmers—the ones viewed as the
7eHite5 in tJe AM'iQan *o*&Hism e(&ation—were owning too many
farms per person.137 He therefore invaded the farms, claiming
tJat Je jo&HO im*Hement a Mai' 7HanO 'eOist'il&tion *'o`
gramme^5138 Seventeen years later, most of the farms that were
seized now belong to Mugabe, his friends, and senior ZANU PF
officials, some of whom own more than ten farms.139
Julias Malema, the leader of a political party in South Africa,
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), has made it clear that he
emulates Robert Mugabe, insofar as redistribution of land from
the white minority to the black majority is concerned.140 In the
Preamble of the Founding Manifesto of the EFF, it is made clear
that the objective of the EZZ is to 7HoQate tJe st'&LLHe Mo' eQo`
nomic emancipation within the long resistance of South Africans
to racist colonial and imperialist, political, economic, and social
Oomination^5141 6Je [ZZ QHea'Hh iOentiMies itseHM as 7a 'aOiQaHb
leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement with an in-
ternationalist outlook anchored by popular grassroots for-
mations anO st'&LLHesb5 aimeO at tJe 'eQHaiminL oM nat&'aH 'e`
135. See generally CHARLES LAURIE & STEPHEN CHAN, THE LAND REFORM
DECEPTION: POLITICALOPPORTUNISM IN ZIMBABWE’S LAND SEIZURE ERA (2016).
136. See generally id.
137. See generally id.
138. See generally id.
139. Grace Machoko, Land Reform Programme—The Truth, CONTINENTAL
NEWS NETWORK (July 31, 2011), https://allnewsnetwork.word-
press.com/2011/07/31/2036/https://allnewsnetwork.word-
press.com/2011/07/31/2036/; see also CHARLES LAURIE & STEPHEN CHAN, THE
LAND REFORM DECEPTION: POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM IN ZIMBABWE’S LAND
SEIZURE ERA 2N3 (2016).
140. See Ngwako Modjadji, Juju Vows to Follow Mugabe’s Policies, CITIZEN
(Feb. 8, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/10439/juju-
vows-to-followmugabes-policies/.
141. Founding Manifesto, ECON. FREEDOM FIGHTERS, pmbl. (2013),
http://docs.wix-
static.com/ugd/35f96d_57165ce79697410490666379d53f2c04.pdfwww.ef-
fonline.org/eff-founding-manifesto.
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sources, such as land and mines from white people, without com-
pensation.142 While there are justifications in a land reform pro-
gram or economic redistribution in South Africa, the challenge,
just in Zimbabwe and anywhere else, is not only that in the
hands of a populist leader—one who does not respect any consti-
tutional constraints—minority rights are at themercy of thema-
jority, but also that populist leaders seldom deliver on their
promises of economic emancipation.143 As in the case of Robert
S&Laleb manh Qan onHh 7emanQi*ate5 tJei' ojn *oQkets^144
In the same regard, Donald Trump has failed on his campaign
*'omise to 7O'ain tJe sjam*5 oM Qo''&*t Ame'iQan eHites^ 4^8^
Senator, ElizabethWarren, has commented as follows on Donald
6'&m*’s *'omise<
He promised to shake up our corrupt political system, right?
After all, when President Elect announced his campaign, he
called out the politicians who are controlled fully by lobbyists,
lh tJe Oono's anO lh tJe 3s*eQiaH inte'ests^’ Xe *'omiseO tJat
Je jiHH 3O'ain tJe sjam*’ in WasJinLton rC^ oAMte' Je Lot
eHeQteOnb liL s&'*'ise2 6'&m* is not 3O'aininL tJe sjam*b’ nope.
Xe is in%itinL tJe liLLestb &LHiest 3sjam*monste's’ in tJe M'ont
door and he is turning them loose on our government and on
our economy.145
In light of the above, if populists cannot guarantee or ensure
the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights that they have promised,
tJen 7tJe 'eO&Qtion in tJe Qontent anO sQo*e oM Qi%iH anO *oHitiQaH
rights that populism proposes seem[s] to be gratuitous, nothing
mo'e tJan a &seHess saQ'iMiQe^5146 Wt leQomes senseHess to 7aQQe*t
a regimen with less freedom without minimum guarantees—
which populism cannot offer—[where there is no] advance in eco-
nomiQ I&stiQe^5147 When populists fail to uphold these promises
142. Id. ¶ 26.
143. See Max du Preez, Mugabe No Hero of Africa, IOL NEWS (Sept. 2, 2014,
7:39 AM), https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/mugabe-no-hero-of-af-
rica-1744350.
144. Id.
145. See Reflect, Elizabeth Warren DESTROYS Trump’s “Drain the Swamp5
Lie, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1jV7Q6Ff7A; OFFS. OF SENATORS
ELIZABETH WARREN & SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, PRESIDENT TRUMP’S DRAIN THE
SWAMP REPORT CARD (2017), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/docu-
ments/2017_07_20_Trump_Drain_the_Swamp_Report_Card.pdf.
146. Alegre, supra note 30, at 6.
147. Id.
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and do not respect human rights or democracy, the question then
becomes whether or not they can be held accountable. Can con-
stit&tionaHism’s QJeQks anO laHanQes aQt as a l&Hja'k aLainst
the excesses of populist leaders?
B. Populism, Accountability, Constitutionalism, Checks and
Balances
Accountability and responsibility are not only important in
governance, but also in international law. Where leaders refuse
to be accountable or take responsibility for their failures or in-
fractions of the law, in this case, violations of human rights, the
law becomes nothing but the proverbial brutum fulmen—a
harmless thunderbolt.148 Steven Ratner has correctly noted that
the purpose of law, both at the domestic and international level,
is 7not onHh in settinL stanOa'Os Mo' Lo%e'nmentsb non-state ac-
tors and their agents, [but also in] prescrib[ing] the conse-
quences of a failure to meet tJose stanOa'Os^5149 Human rights
norms and standards are meaningless if leaders refuse to abide
by them or simply ignore them.150 Accountability and responsi-
bility of populist leaders is fundamental because it is inherently
QonneQteO to tJe %iQtim’s 'iLJt to a remedy.151 It is a settled norm
of international human rights law that victims of violations have
a right to a remedy.152 The state has a corresponding duty to pro-
vide victims with remedies.153
Roj tJat *o*&Hists leHie%e tJat tJeh 'e*'esent 7tJe *eo*He5 in
whatever decisions they make, or that, in fact, they are the em-
loOiment oM 7tJe *eo*Heb5 tJe iOea oM leinL alo%e tJe Hajb es*e`
cially the laws that are considered to lack democratic legitimacy
Oe'i%eO M'om 7tJe *eo*Heb5 'esonates jitJ manh *o*&Hists^ Wt is
148. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (2009).
149. STEVEN RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THENUREMBURG LEGACY 3 (2009).
150. ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
292, 293 (2009).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See INT’L L. COMM’N., DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLYWRONGFULACTS, art. 5 (2001), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/in-
struments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 31 [80] on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 8 (May
26, 2004).
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difficult, therefore, to demand accountability or responsibility
based on international law or international human rights norms
that some of the populists consider to be foreign and immoral.
The attitude of some populist leaders, that of not respecting in-
ternational human rights law, international institutions of ac-
countability, and enforcement mechanisms, is not only a threat
to the rights of citizens within the borders of a country con-
cerned, but is also a menace to the maintenance of peace and
security at the international level and across the globe.154
There are scholars who have written on the relationship be-
tween populism and various facets of constitutionalism and ac-
countability. The whole or main idea behind constitutionalism is
7tJe iOea oM HeLaH Qonst'aint oM Qoe'Qi%e state *oje'^5155 In this
regard, the constitution as the supreme law of the land, plays a
fundamental rule. Yet, the idea that ultimate power and author-
ity is derived from the constitution may not sit well with many
populists, whose view is that nothing is more important, or can
supersede, the general will of the people.156 Cas Mudde notes
tJat 7*o*&Hism is an eit'eme Mo'm oMmaIo'ita'ianism5 tJat Qan`
not le 'eQonQiHeO jitJ 7Qonstit&tionaHism ojJiQJn Himits lotJ
popular sovereignty and majority '&He^5157 Most populists in
power refuse the inclusion of minority rights in constitutions
based on majoritarianism, and they seek to use constitutions to
limit powers of non-majoritarian institutions.158 Cas Mudde has
also described the relationship between populists, constitutions,
and constitutional judges as opportunistic.159 Where the consti-
tution supports their viewpoints, they embrace it; where it does
not, it is condemned as a product of the corrupt elite.160 Of
course, the question may be what happens when a populist
leader does not have a problemwith a constitution? Does it mean
that in those circumstances, the populist leader can respect the
constitution and by extension, some forms of constitutionalism?
154. See JOHN JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE
2 (2003).
155. SeeMudde, supra note 17, at 4.
156. Id. at 1.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1.
159. See id. at 14.
160. Id.
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As noted by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, the fact that a popu-
list leader does not have a problem with the provisions of a cer-
tain constitution does not mean that the populist leader will re-
spect it or agree to be held responsible for its provisions.161 For
example, populists may object to unelected bodies, such as the
judiciary or supranational institutions, interpreting the consti-
tution and holding them accountable.162 In this sense, populist
leaders heavily criticize judicial interpretation of constitutions.
Likewise, when constitutional judges rule in their favor, popu-
lists praise them as standing for the people, when they do not,
they are condemned as agents of the elites, subverting the will
of the people. As previously mentioned, the recent comments
from President Kenyatta, following the Supreme Court of
Uenha’s OeQision on tJe %aHiOith oM tJe E\G? Uenhan eHeQtionsb
are telling in this regard.
Theoretically, when one takes into consideration that many
Qonstit&tions aQ'oss tJe LHole sta't jitJ tJe *J'ase 7je tJe *eo`
*Heb5 anO a'e s&**oseOHh 7an ei*'ession oM tJe *eo*He’s %iejs anO
%aH&esb5 one Qo&HO *otentiaHHh a'L&e tJat manh Qonstit&tions a'e
populist or potentially populist.163 Yet, studies carried out by
sQJoHa's HikeSiHa 1e'steeL Ja%e sJojn tJat 7tJe jo'HO’s Qonsti`
tutions are not meaningfully supported by the people they rep-
resent and that the global practice of constitution-making can be
QJa'aQte'igeO as an eie'Qise in &n*o*&Ha' Qonstit&tionaHism^5164
Constitutions, one would note, are largely influenced by interna-
tional norms that have been accepted by civilized nations.165 In
*'otest oM inte'nationaH no'ms’ inMH&enQe on Qonstit&tionsb 1e'`
steeg notes that populist leaders can make or amend constitu-
tions to 7se'%e as &ni(&e anO OeMininL statements oM nationaH iOe`
aHs anO *o*&Ha' %aH&esb5 anO in tJe *'oQessb 7MHout universal hu-
man rights norms or well-established principles of constitutional
OesiLn^5166 Thus, in fact, constitutionalism and its norms are
161. Cristóbal R. Kaltwasser, Populism vs. Constitutionalism? Comparative
Perspectives on Contemporary Western Europe, Latin America, and the United
States, FOUND. L., JUST. & SOC’Y 6 (2013).
162. Id.
163. Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L. J. 1133, 1133
(2014).
164. Id.
165. JOANNE WALLIS, CONSTITUTION MAKING DURING STATE BUILDING 50N51
(2014).
166. Versteeg, supra note 163.
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largely shaped by international norms and universal right
norms—the universality of which populists denounce.167
With this obvious conflict of ideology and perception, can con-
stit&tionaHism’s QJeQks anO laHanQesb s&QJ as Qo&'tsb aQt as a l&H`
wark against populists? While Tjitske Akkerman has noted that
tJe'e is 7'eason to le QonQe'neO alo&t tJe *'ess&'es tJat *o*&`
list pa'ties *&t on Qonstit&tionaH QJeQks anO laHanQesb5168 Peter
XaHH Jas loHOHh stateO tJat 7*o*&Hist HeaOe's OismantHe tJe
QJeQks anO laHanQes on jJiQJ Hile'aH OemoQ'aQh Oe*enOs^5169
Populists firmly believe that all legislative power belongs to the
*eo*He o' to *a'Hiament jJo a'e eHeQteO lh 7tJe *eo*Heb5 anO as
s&QJb 7laHanQinL *oje' %ia non-elected judges, for instance, is
tJe'eMo'e Qont'a'h to *o*&Hist *'inQi*He^5170As a result, most pop-
ulist leaders do not respect the principle of separation of powers
between the executive, judiciary, and legislature. In its 2017 Re-
port, the Council of Europe asked whether checks and balances
in Member States are strong enough to counter the challenges
posed by populism.171 The answer given in the study report is
non-aMMi'mati%eb notinLb amonL otJe' tJinLsb tJat 7nationaH I&Oi`
ciaries [are] open to political influence [by populists] and fuelling
public perceptions of interference in the judicial process and bias
amonL inOi%iO&aH I&OLes^5172 To the same effect, Marcelo Alegre
notes tJat *o*&Hist *oHitiQs 7jeaken Qont'oHs on tJe stateb
whether the judiciary or other regulatory agencies, including in-
ternational controls, with the attendant risk to the protection of
J&man 'iLJts^5173
With these challenges notwithstanding, some commentators
have expressed hope that courts—especially constitutional
courts—miLJt aQt as a l&Hja'k aLainst *o*&Hists’ eiQesses^174 In
this regard, one can refer to the decision of the Ninth Circuit,
167. WALLIS, supra note 165.
168. Tjitske Akkerman, Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology?,
38 ACTA POL. 147, 155 (2003).
169. Hall, supra note 46, at 9.
170. Akkerman, supra note 168.
171. See Thorbjørn Jagland, State of Democracy,Human Rights and the Rule
of Law Populism—How Strong are Europe’s Checks and Balances?, COE 7
(2017), https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/populism-how-strong-are-europe-s-
checks-and-balances-.
172. See id.
173. Alegre, supra note 30, at 1.
174. See Alon Harel, Courts in a Populist World, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 27,
2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/courts-in-a-populist-world/.
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jJiQJ set asiOe :'esiOentronaHO 6'&m*’s lan on nationaHs M'om
certain Muslim countries traveling to the United States.175 In
tJis senseb Qo&'ts a'e seen as 'isinL 7alo%e tJe Ois*&tes jJiQJ
Oi%iOe tJe *&lHiQ5176 anO 'eM'aininL M'om 7OesQenOinL into the
a'ena oM *&lHiQ Oelateb5177 not concerning themselves with
jJetJe' tJei' 7'&HinL jiHH le a**Ha&OeO lh some oM tJe *&lHiQ
anO &tte'Hh o' %eJementHh 'eIeQteO lh otJe's^5178 It is in the same
vein that the Supreme Court of Israel observed that a judge
7m&st a%oid market-etJiQ *'aLmatism5 jJe'e Je o' sJe is inMH&`
enQeO lh 7Oisto'teO %iejs 'am*ant in soQieth^5179 In warning
against judges being influenced by populist influences, one court
olse'%eO tJat 7oon&' HeLaH eO&Qationb o&' I&OiQiaH ei*e'ienQe anO
our faith in the law give us composure even, in the midst of the
turbulent mood which surrounds us. We are guided by principles
anO M&nOamentaH %aH&esb not t'ansient s*i'its oM tJe times^5180
Nevertheless, Juan Gonzalez has argued that in an era of pop-
ulism, if courts confront populist leaders head-on, they will prob-
ably lose.181 There are many examples of courts which have been
dismantled or judges who have been reshuffled after ruling
against certain leaders. The Southern African Development
Community Tribunal (SADC) is a good example of a regional
court that was victimized for going against African populist sen-
timents.182 After failing to find local remedies in Zimbabwe,
white farmers, who were deprived of land through unconstitu-
tional means, approached the then SADC tribunal seeking a
175. SeeWashington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, (9th Cir. 2017); R v. Secretary
of State [2017] UKSC 5, [2016] NIQB 85, https://www.su-
premecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf; Democratic Alliance
v. Min of Int. Relations & Others, 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP) (S. Afr.), No.
83145/2016.
176. HCJ 390/79, Duwekat v. Government of Israel, 47(4) 210 (1993) (Isr.),
HCJ 390/79.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Swissa v. Attorney General, (1994) Isr. SC 48(2) 749 (1994) (Isr.).
180. Zarzevsky v. The Prime Minister, HCJ 1635/90.
181. Juan Gonzalez, Working Well is the Best Strategy: Judges Under Popu-
lism, VERFASSUNGSBLOG.DE (May 3, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/working-
well-is-the-best-strategy-judges-under-populism/.
182. See generally Laurie Nathan, The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A
Cautionary Tale, 35 HUM. RTS. QUARTERLY 870 (2013).
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remedy.183 The SADC tribunal ruled in favor of the white farm-
ers.184 The SADC tribunal was condemned by Robert Mugabe
and other African leaders as a racist court that was perpetuating
neo-colonialism to the detriment of black Africans.185 As a result,
the court was dismantled by the SADC leaders.186
Likewise, Uhuru Kenyatta, after the Supreme Court of Kenya
recently ruled against him, argued that the Court was subvert-
inL tJe 7jiHH oM tJe *eo*Heb5 anO tJat Je jas LoinL to 7Mii5 tJe
Court.187 President Kenhatta’s statements aHso 'einMo'Qe tJe a'`
gument that populists undermine courts and judges because
they are not elected and, as such, their exercise of power is ille-
gitimate. Addressing a rally after the 2017 Kenyan presidential
election had been annulled by the Kenyan Supreme Court, Pres-
iOent 4J&'& Uenhatta stateO tJatb 7ojne sJaHH 'e%isit tJis tJinL^
We clearly have a problem. Who even election you? Were you?
We Ja%e a *'olHem anO je m&st Mii it^5188 If Kenyatta wins the
forthcoming election, it is likely that the judges who decided the
Qase jiHH MaQe *oHitiQaH *'ess&'e M'om Uenhatta’s Lo%e'nment^
Thus, while there is no doubt that courts have a role to play as
far as restraining populist leaders, they can also become victims
of the machinations of populist regimes.
It is also worthwhile to note some of the comments from Ron
Dudai. He argues that the current wave of populism is not nec-
essa'iHh tJe *'ime 7Qa&se oM tJe Q&''ent sense oM Q'isis Mo' J&man
'iLJts^5189 Rather, he argues that populism has only brought to
the forefront longer and wider trends that have been weakening
human rights.190 Wn s&**o't oM r&Oai’s a'L&mentb 1iIah RaLa'aI
183. See Precious N. Ndlovu, Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A Moment
of Truth for The SADC Tribunal, 1 S.A.D.C. L.J. 63 (2011).
184. See generally Nathan, supra note 182.
185. See Peter Fabricus, Selfish JZ Allowed Mugabe to Kill SADC Tribunal,
IOL NEWS (March 3, 2012, 2:22 PM), https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/selfish-
jz-allowed-mugabe-to-kill-sadc-tribunal-1479714.
186. See generally Nathan, supra note 182.
187. See Kenya Election: Kenyatta Vows to ‘Fix’ Court as Win Quashed, BBC
(Sept. 2, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
41136478http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41136478.
188. See Kenya President Says Problem With Judiciary Must Be Fixed, Vows
to “Revisit” After New Election, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2017, 7:18 AM),
https://af.reuters.com/article/commodi-
tiesNews/idAFL8N1LJ0AR?feedType=RSS&feedName=kenyaNews.
189. Dudai, supra note 44, at 17.
190. Id.
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notes that one of such factors weakening the human rights pro-
ject is the selective accountability for human rights violations
across the globe, and the attempt of the human rights project to
cover everything.191 In the same vein, Dudai notes as follows:
Human rights are not just under direct attack from [populists]:
the human rights currency was exposed as insufficient to pur-
chase many goods; it transpired that many do not respect this
currency; some started using other currencies which appear
stronger in gaining these goods; the value of the human rights
currency was diminished by over-printing; and the trust in it
has been reduced by what appear to be too many counterfeit
human rights currencies being circulated by its opponents.192
Of course, the limitation of the above argument is that there is
no s*eQiMiQation Mo' jJiQJ 7'iLJts5 tJe 7J&man 'iLJts Q&''enQh5
is not supposed to buy. In general, there is no principled argu-
ment why the human rights spectrum should not be widened, as
long as what is covered falls within human entitlements or
rights.
III. POPULISM, NATIONAL, AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Outside democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights, pop-
ulism also interrelates and plays a visible role with national and
international justice. There is also literature—albeit scant—dis-
cussing the impact of populism on the justice system, in partic-
ular, criminal justice systems, both at the domestic and interna-
tional level. Justice systems intersect with, and play an im-
portant role in themes such as accountability, protection of hu-
man rights, and constitutionalism.193 Populism in other aspects
of life, such as the criminal justice system, is even thought to
have heralded the current form of populism being witnessed to-
day.194 In their discussion of penal populism, John Pratt and
SiQJeHHe Siao *osit tJat 7*enaH *o*&Hism sJo&HO le &nOe'stooO
as only a convenient incubating phase in which populist forces
191. Nagaraj, supra note 99, at 22N23.
192. Dudai, supra note 44, at 18.
193. ANTHONY AMATRUDO & LESLIE WILLIAM BLAKE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2014).
194. John Pratt & Michelle Miao, Penal Populism: The End of Reason,
CRIMINOLOGY COLLECTIVE 2 (2017), https://www.criminologycollective.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/Penal-Populism-End-of-reason-2017.pdf.
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found vigour and strength before flowing much deeper into
mainst'eam soQieth M'om tJat Lestation^5195 6o tJat enOb 7*enaH
populism was only a warning of the much greater chaos that was
to Qome jJen *o*&Hism jas M&HHh &nHeasJeO^5196
It is common in *o*&Hist Qam*aiLns to Jea' tJe mant'a 7W jiHH
Let to&LJ on Q'ime^5197 President Donald Trump repeatedly
talked of America as being infested by undocumented immi-
grants who are committing crimes, promising to deal with
them.198 Likewise, in his campaign, President Rodrigo Duterte
oM tJe :JiHi**ines *'omiseO 7to 'iO tJe Qo&nt'h oM Q'ime anO
O'&Ls lh kiHHinL tJo&sanOs oM Q'iminaHs^5199 It is in that sense
that Will Jennings and others have referred to penal populism
as the politicization of crime by populists and their parties.200
The fundamental question, however, is whether populist sen-
timents influence the justice system in a positive or negative
manner. It is a common cause that public punitive opinion influ-
ences populist policy, as far as criminalization and incarceration
are concerned. What is worrisome, however, as noted by John
Pratt and Michelle Miao, is that when penal populism succeeds,
it 7&nOe'mines tJe %e'h ke'neH on jJiQJ moOe'n *&nisJment
has been built: the way in which, from the time of the enlighten-
ment, science, rationality and expert knowledge were expected
to outweigh emotive, uninformed common-sense, thereby ensur-
ing that reason outweighed anti-reason in the development of
*enaH *oHiQh^5201 The result of that, for example, is the imposition
of long prison terms that are not supported by scientific reasons
for the purpose of punishment.202
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2.
197. Mike Hough, Populism and Punitive Penal Policy, 49 CRIM. JUST.
MATTERS, at 4 (2002).
198. See Promises about Immigration on Trump-O-Meter, POLITIFACT,
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/subjects/im-
migration/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
199. See Adrian Chen, When a Populist Demagogue Takes Power, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2016/11/21/when-a-populist-demagogue-takes-power.
200. WILL JENNINGS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND THE PUBLIC THERMOSTAT:
CRIME, PUBLIC PUNITIVENESS AND PUBLIC POLICY, CARDIFF.AC.UK (2016),
http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/epop2015/files/2016/02/Penal-Populism-and-the-Pub-
lic-Thermostat-Crime-Public-Punitiveness-and-Public-Policy-Will-Jen-
nings.pdf.
201. Pratt & Miao, supra note 194, at 2.
202. Id.
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One of the areas where penal populism has been playing an
influential role relates to the place of capital punishment inmod-
ern society. Regardless of lack of conclusive evidence that the
death penalty has any deterrent effect, penal populism has en-
sured the retaining of the death penalty in many penal systems
across the globe.203 For example, in China, Michelle Miao has
noteO tJat 7as an inst'&ment Mo' tJe a&tJo'ities to govern the
country in the name of the people, capital punishment functions
as a tooH Mo' *oHitiQaH st'&LLHes^5204 The Chinese government im-
poses the death penalty for certain crimes in a bid to meet Chi-
nese *eo*He’s OemanOs Mo' I&stiQeb 'e%enLeb anO e(&aHity, all
while enhancing its political legitimacy in the process. In that
'eLa'Ob 7tJe OeatJ *enaHth se'%es as a *o*&Hist meQJanism to
strengthen the resilience of the authoritarian party-state by
venting public anxiety and resentment towards social prob-
lems^5205 Therefore, to gain popularity and power, populists are
7ta**inL into tJe *&lHiQ’s seeminLHh *&niti%e stanQe on Q'ime Mo'
their own electoral advantage, bymanipulating this with extrav-
aLant *'omises alo&t jJat mo'e *&nisJment jiHH aQJie%eb5206
jJiHe at tJe same time Q'itiQiginL tJe *e'Qei%eO 7eHite *oHitiQaH
QHassb5 jJo a'e seen as *'oteQtinL Q'iminaHs at tJe ei*ense oM tJe
citizens.
The above narrative is correct in relation to counter-terrorism
laws, especially those related to interrogation and rights of ter-
ror-suspects. It is in the realm of penal populism that President
Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines promised to be tough on
crime, even if it meant violating the right to life.207 Likewise,
Donald Trump promised his supporters that he would approve
torture of terror-suspects, even if it meant offending jus cogens
norms, regardless of the plethora of expert opinion that torture
does not work.208 In this regard, the value of expert opinions and
203. See id.
204. Michelle Miao, Capital Punishment in China: A Populist Instrument of
Social Governance, 17 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 233, 233 (2013).
205. Id.
206. Pratt & Miao, supra note 194, at 8.
207. See Chen, supra note 199.
208. Stephanie Boland, Memo to President Donald Trump: Torture Doesn’t
Work, NEW STATEMAN (2017), http://www.newstatesman.com/poli-
tics/uk/2017/01/memo-president-donald-trump-torture-doesn-t-work; John Bo-
hannon, Scientists to Trump: Torture Doesn’t Work, SCIENCE MAG. (2017),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/scientists-trump-torture-doesn-t-
work.
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international norms on the criminal justice system is not only
distrusted, but is viewed as another form of elitism that should
be met with outrage and derision.209
Although not limited to the criminal justice system, some
scholars have also discussed what is termed judicial populism.
While courts may act as a bulwark against populists, it may also
be that courts negatively influence the justice system, especially
where courts choose to embrace populism.210 Judges may be in-
fluenced by public opinion and may be worried more about per-
sonal reputation than institutional reputation.211 Some judges
may have political interests or may want to ride with the popular
wave, where they are praised as heroes. Thus, in relation to the
right to non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation,
one Israeli court noted that tJe Qase jas to le 7OeQiOeO on tJe
lasis oM tJe aQQe*teO soQiaH o&tHooks^5212
Populism can also be seen as influencing and affecting the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), especially the attitude to-
wards one of the leading institutions of international criminal
law. Notwithstanding various attempts made by scholars and
organizations to dismantle and debunk the view that the ICC is
targeting African states,213 populist African leaders and the Af-
rican Union (AU) continue to peddle the idea that the ICC is an
arm of neo-imperialism.214 The AU has passed resolutions ask-
ing African states not to cooperate with the ICC.215 A number of
African states have formally noted their intention to withdraw
209. Pratt & Miao, supra note 194, at 9.
210. Or Bassok, The Supreme Court at the Bar of Public Opinion Polls, 23
CONSTELLATIONS 573, 573 (2016), https://philpapers.org/rec/BASTSC-3.
211. See generally BAUM LAWRENCE, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR (2009).
212. HCJ 721/94 El Al Israeli Airlines Ltd. v Danilovich, PD 749 (1994) (Isr.).
213. See SOUTHERN AFRICA LITIGATION CENTRE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND AFRICA THE STATE OF SOUTHERN AFR. LITIG. CTR., PLAY (2016),
http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/05/International-Criminal-Justice-and-Africa.pdf.
214. Id.; see also, PIERRE HAZAN & SARAH DE STADELHOFEN, JUDGING WAR,
JUDGINGHISTORY: BEHIND TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 161 (2010).
215. See African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV), Decision on the Progress
Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision Assem-
bly/AU/10(XV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XV) (2010).
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from the ICC.216 It is in this sense that Evelyn Ankumah has
OesQ'ileO a 7*o*&Hist *essimist mo%ement tJat I&st QonOemns
anO o**oses tJe WCC anO its 'oHe in AM'iQa^5217 Nevertheless, alt-
hough there are many scholars who are of the view that popu-
lism exerts negative influence on the justice system, both at the
national and international level, there are other scholars, like
Julia Quilter, who argue that in certain circumstances, populism
plays a positive role.218 8Je a'L&es tJatb 7*o*&Hism Qan *'oO&Qe
forms of citizen engagement in the criminal justice context that
a'e nej anO *'oL'essi%e^5219 To make this point, she used the
2012 Australian case study of the killing of Thomas Kelly in Syd-
ney.220 Wn tJat *a'tiQ&Ha' Qaseb 7a *o*&Hist Qam*aiLn *oje'M&HHh
realigned political allegiance to call for, and achieve, real and
enduring action from the New South Wales Government in ad-
dressing alcohol-'eHateO %ioHenQe^5221
While there is literature discussing the relationship or impact
of populism on many disciplines and fields, such as democracy,
human rights, constitutionalism, international criminal law,
and the media, there is no substantial literature discussing pop-
ulist policies that are contrary to customary international law
and the duties of states in that respect. There are, however, pop-
ulist policies that do in fact contradict international law obliga-
tions.
IV. POPULISM AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
As indicated above, during his campaign, Donald Trump prom-
ised his supporters that he would approve waterboarding or tor-
ture for terror suspects. He particularly noted as follows:
216. The states that have indicated their intent to leave the ICC include
South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia, while countries such as Nigeria and Cam-
eroon are opposing. Emmanuel Igunza, See African Union Backs Mass With-
drawal from ICC, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-38826073.
217. African Legal Aid (AFLA), THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
AFRICA: ONEDECADEON, at xi (Evelyn Ankumah ed., 2016).
218. Julia Quilter, Populism and Criminal Justice Policy: An Australian
Case Study of Non-Punitive Responses to Alcohol-Related Violence, 48 AUSTL.
& N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY, 24, 25 (2015).
219. Id.
220. See Thomas Kelly Died From Fall After Punch, ABC NEWS (July 15,
2012, 6:32 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-16/thomas-kelly-died-
from-fall-after-punch/4132088.
221. Quilter, supra note 218.
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They said what do you think of waterboarding? I said I like it
a Hot l&t W Oon’t tJink it is to&LJ eno&LJ^ qo& Ja%e to MiLJt fire
with fire. Would I approve waterboarding? You bet your ass I
jo&HO a**'o%e itb in a Jea'tleat^ AnO Oon’t teHH me to't&'e
Ooesn’t jo'kb to't&'e jo'ks^222
6Je main OisQ&ssion in tJis :a't jiHH 'eHate to a state’s inte'`
national law obligations when faced with a populist demagogue
who promises to violate norms of customary international law
and those part of jus cogens. It will start, however, by comment-
ing on whether the current form of populism not only means the
end of the human rights age, but also the importance of interna-
tional law as contemplated by some scholars.
Before that discussion, however, it is interesting to note that
when one questions why the United States did not disqualify
Donald Trump from the presidential race on the basis of his
promises to violate human rights and norms of jus cogens, the
reply from some commentators is that what Donald Trump and
other populists say during campaigns is just rhetoric. Once in
power, however, populist leaders will not make good on their
promises—and even if they want to, existing checks and bal-
ances cannot allow them—and as such, no harm is done. To that,
Jan-Werner Muller has responded as follows:
Populists can govern as populists. This goes against the con-
ventional wisdom which holds that populists protest parties
cancel themselves out once they win election . . . populists gov-
ernance exhibits three features: attempts to hijack the state
a**a'at&sb Qo''&*tion anO 3mass QHienteHism’ ft'aOinL mate'iaH
benefits or bureaucratic favours for political support by citizens
who become the populist clients); and efforts systematically to
suppress civil society.223
Having already discussed the limitations of checks and bal-
ances, for some norms of jus cogens, such as prohibition of tor-
ture, it may not matter whether the actual torture is carried out
in the future, as the threat of torture itself is prohibited.
The question then becomes, is the exclusion of such populist
leaders the only effective solution? If so, is such exclusion sanc-
tioned in international law, or better still, does it exist as an in-
222. MSNBC, Donald Trump Says Torture ‘Absolutely Works,’ YOUTUBE
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlGqktVKtNA.
223. MULLER, supra note 12, at 4.
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ternational obligation on states? From the beginning, it is inter-
esting to note Jan-We'ne' S&HHe'’s a'L&ment tJat 7eiQH&OinL
populists from debate altogether (is not) a viable option since it
simply responds to the populist will to exclusion by excluding the
*o*&Hist^5224 S&HHe'’s a**'oaQJ is s&**o'teO lh :JiHi**e
8QJmitte'b jJo aHso a'L&es tJat 7anh eMMo't to eiQH&Oe tJem o*o*`
ulists] from competition would be worse than the damage they
Qo&HO *otentiaHHh *'oO&Qe^5225
Of course, S&HHe' anO 8QJmitte'’s a'L&ments a'e L'o&nOeO in
politics and the idea that participation in political debates is es-
sential for any liberal democracy.226 This article, however,
makes arguments in the confines of the law, particularly cus-
tomary international law.
A. Does Populism End the Importance of International Law and
the Human Rights Era?
Do the challenges posed by the current wave of populism to
human rights and the continued disrespect of international law
mean that international law has lost its lustre and that we
should abandon it? It is of course inevitable to have this discus-
sion because customary international law, the main subject of
this Part, is included in international law. Not only have schol-
a's s&LLesteO tJat je a'e Q&''entHh MaQinL 7tJe end-times of hu-
man 'iLJts5227 or that we should find other tools to fight popu-
lism outside the human rights framework,228 but that general
norms of international law are losing their importance in the
populist age.229
AQQo'OinL to 8te%en Xo*LooOb 7jJat seemeO like a dawn is in
MaQt a s&nsetb5230 as 7tJe Mo&nOations oM &ni%e'saH Hile'aH no'ms
224. Id. at 4.
225. Schmitter, supra note 16, at 10.
226. AJUME H. WINGO, VEIL POLITICS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATES 19
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
227. SeeHopgood, supra note 28; STEVENHOPGOOD, THEENDTIMES OFHUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (2015).
228. Samuel Moyn, Trump and the Limits of Human Rights, OPEN
DEMOCRACY (Nov. 14, 2016), https://
www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/samuel-moyn/trump-and-limits-of-
human-rightswww.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/samuel-moyn/trump-
and-limits-of-human-rights.
229. HOPGOOD, supra note 227, at 1; see also Hopgood, supra note 28.
230. Id.; HOPGOOD, supra note 227.
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anO LHolaH Lo%e'nanQe a'e Q'&mlHinL^5231 With President
6'&m*’s %iQto'hb Xo*LooO e%en s&LLests tJat 7J&man 'iLJts aQ`
tivists should devote themselves to the morass of domestic poli-
tiQsb not inte'nationaH Haj anO no'ms^5232 To the same effect, In-
L'iO W&e'tJ Jas noteO tJat je a'e 7aH'eaOh in tJe *ost-human
rights era of international law, meaning that the enforcement
and expansion of human rights through binding international
law wilH OeQHine^5233 Wuerth even appears to give up on interna-
tionaH Haj’s &seM&Hness in J&man 'iLJts *'oteQtionb 'eQkoninL
tJat 7a t&'n ajah M'om &sinL inte'nationaH Haj to *'omote J&`
man rights—whether or not the first best choice in an ideal
world—creates an opportunity to strengthen other vitally im-
*o'tant no'ms oM inte'nationaH Haj^5234 Hopgood has explained
that international law is losing its position on the global scale
because of the prevalence of unremedied human rights viola-
tions across the globe, the failures of the ICC, failure of the in-
ternational norm of Responsibility to Protect in various coun-
tries, and the recent election of populist demagogues like Donald
6'&m*b jJiQJ Je %iejs as 7tJe Hatest *ieQes oM e%iOenQe not oM
transient misfortunes but of fatal structural defects in interna-
tionaH J&manism^5235 Eric Posner, on the other hand, has argued
tJat tJe 7OeniL'ation5 oM inte'nationaH Haj anO OisinteL'ation oM
rules-laseO inte'nationaH o'Oe' is O&e to 7*o*&Hist laQkHasJ
around the world [that] has targeted international law and legal
instit&tions5236 on tJe lasis tJat 7inte'nationaH Haj is a Oe%iQe
used by global elites to dominate policymaking and benefit
tJemseH%es at tJe ei*ense oM tJe Qommon *eo*He^5237 According
to Posner, in the face of the current wave of populism, the idea
of one world under international law, international institutions,
and secular human rights, is evading humanity.238
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233. Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Age of Trump: A Post-Human
Rights Agenda, LAWFARE (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/inter-
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In noting its position on the challenges that are posed by pop-
&Hism to tJe 7'&Hes-laseO inte'nationaH o'Oe'b5 tJe 4^U^ govern-
ment Jas aHso ei*'esseO 7QonQe'ns alo&t LHolaHiognation# anO
pushback from other countries at the United Nations (UN)
against the International Criminal Court, and against concepts
such as the Responsibility to Protect [and] human rights
no'ms^5239 It emphasized that such rules have provided the bed-
rock of security for many countries, including the United King-
dom.240 Such security is threatened by the current wave of pop-
ulism. International law and order also face threats from states
that seek to expand their global power. Ulrich Speck argued that
*o*&Hist HeaOe's jJo a'e HeaOinL 3'e%isionist’ *oje'sb Hike CJina
and Russia, not only want to change international politics, but
also the international legal order, which they consider to be
skewed against them. He argues that for Beijing and Moscow,
the current international system, in its current form, is unac-
ceptable.241 He notes as follows:
Both China and Russia would like to see the authoritarian sys-
tem they have built at home mirrored in international rela-
tions< an inte'nationaHiseO 3*oje' %e'tiQaHb’ to lo''oj a :&tinist
concept, in which strong countries command and the weak
obey. Small countries such as Vietnam or the Philippines have
to accept that China demands primacy in the South China Sea;
9&ssia’s neiLJlours such as Ukraine have to accept orders
from Moscow. The idea of international order they have in
mind is multipolar, not multilateral: instead of a system built
on the idea of equality of states, they want a hierarchical order
dominated by a few major states. The liberal order, based on
the consensus between largely sovereign, equal states, is
standing in the way of their designs.242
There is no doubt that populism presents challenges to inter-
national law in general. This does not mean, however, that the
international community should give up on international law.
239. See Gov’t of the U.K., Populism and Nationalism: Implications for the
International Order, (2017) House of Lords 17/02, 3 (Jan. 12, 2017), http://re-
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0002.pdf.
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Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance have already warned that
7jJen &ni%e'saH %aH&es anO inte'nationaH Haj a'e Qast asiOeb
LHolaH aMMai's a'e Lo%e'neO lh Mo'Qe^5243 It is crucial, therefore, to
emphasize the importance of international law in all of this.
Finally, it is interesting to note that when scholars postulate
tJat tJe 7Mo'Qe5 oM inte'nationaH Haj is no mo'eb tJat je a'e in a
post-human rights era or that the human rights age is over, they
presuppose that there has been a golden age of human rights or
that international law has never faced challenges in the past.
Such presuppositions cannot be further from the truth. For ex-
ample, the human rights project has always faced catastrophes
and challenges, from horrendous genocides to egregious crimes
against humanity, where thousands, if not millions, of innocent
children, women, and men were slaughtered. It is in this light
that Ron Dudai criticizes the view that the human rights age in
the United States ended with the election of populist leader Don-
ald Trump. In that regard, he observes as follows:
WJiHe je’HH &nOo&lteOHh miss tJe ;lama AOminist'ationb it
was the one to make Guantanamo permanent, to expand the
unaccountable international assassinations programme, and
to ultimately stand idly by as the greatest catastrophe of our
generation—the horrors of Syria—unfolds. . . . In short, there
never was a human rights golden age which Trump et al. are
now ending.244
Of course, while one agrees with Dudai, it is also important to
note that the rise of populist demagogues in Western democra-
cies, like the United States, is a cause of serious concern when
one considers that in the past, Western democracies—albeit
their weaknesses as pointed out by Dudai—have not only been
exemplary to many governments across the globe, but have
acted as a counterweight against dictators by exercising
pushbacks against the excesses of the said dictators.245 It is in
this regard that Philip Alston notes that with the rise of populist
OemaLoL&es in [&'o*e anO Ame'iQab 7tJe *'os*eQt oM eMMeQti%e
*&sJlaQk in tJe M&t&'e is noj e%a*o'atinL leMo'e o&' ehes^5246 In
243. Arch Puddington & Tyler Roylance, Populists and Autocrats: The Dual
Threat to Global Democracy, FREEDOM HOUSE 25 (2017), https://free-
domhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf.
244. Dudai, supra note 44, at 16N17.
245. Alston, supra note 41, at 3.
246. Id.
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other words, international law is missing states that have been,
to some degree, participating in the enforcement of international
norms. As further discussed by Alston, what is important in all
these discussions is not to give up on the basic principles of in-
ternational law and human rights.247
B. “Speaking Freely” Against Customary International Law
Norms
Donald Trump freely expressed that he supports torture and
that he would approve its use on terror suspects, regardless of
the fact that prohibition of torture is not only part of customary
international law, but jus cogens.248 There is no doubt that free-
dom of expression plays a critical role during elections. Of
Qo&'seb it is *a'aOoiiQaH to taHk alo&t *o*&Hists’ M'eeOom oM ei`
*'essionb as Sa'QeHo AHeL'e Jas noteO tJatb 7*o*&Hist Lo%e'n`
ments often restrict freedom of expression, raising the costs of
leinL in tJe o**osition^5249 Politicians—and everyone else—
should be free to discuss their ideas and visions, even if doing so
challenges the constitutional framework of their country. A line,
however, must be drawn. Should a candidate for public office be
allowed to attack democratic principles and human rights
norms, especially those that are part of customary international
law, all in the name of freedom of expression? Did the United
States violate its international obligation by allowing Donald
Trump to run for public office after he promised to violate a norm
of customary international law?
Every state party to the Convention Against Torture (CAT)
Jas an olHiLation to 7take eMMeQti%e HeLisHati%eb aOminist'ati%eb
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any ter-
ritory under its I&'isOiQtion^5250 Wn te'ms oM tJe CA6b 7no eiQe*`
tionaH Qi'Q&mstanQes jJatsoe%e'5 Qan I&stiMh to't&'e^251 As such,
the prohibition of torture is an absolute and non-derogable
247. Id. at 2.
248. THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL
CONTRACT 235 (2015).
249. Alegre, supra note 30, at 1.
250. G.A. Res. 39/46, supra note 6.
251. Id.
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right.252 Steven Greer has explained the importance of the pro-
hibition of torture and the rationale behind its absoluteness as
follows:
The view that there can be no exception to the right not to be
tortured is based on the moral assumption that torture is in-
herently, and self-evidently, the worst violation of human dig-
nity and autonomy, the worst kind of subordination, objectifi-
cation, and forced self-betrayal of or by the defenceless, and the
worst kind of harm or suffering capable of being inflicted upon
anyone including killing them.253
6J&sb :'esiOent ronaHO 6'&m*’s s&LLestion tJat tJe 4niteO
8tates neeOs 7to MiLJt Mi'e jitJ Mi'e,5 particularly terrorism, can-
not justify acts of torture or threats of torture.254 There must al-
ways be a remedy for victims of torture,255 and those responsible
must be punished.256 While President Donald Trump clearly
promised to revive torture in the United States, no sanctions
were imposed on him. In many cases, courts have held that a
threat of torture can amount to torture, since the prohibition of
torture covers both physical pain and mental suffering.257 For
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights observed
252. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948); Eur. Ct. H.R., European Convention on Human Rights art. 3,
November 4, 1950, E.T.S. 005 [hereinafter ECHR]; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), su-
pra note 6, at 175; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 5, Oct.
21, 1986, http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf; In-
ter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Inter-American Convention on Human Rights art. 5(2),
Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). See also General Comment Number 20,
Committee of the Red Cross on Civil and Political Rights ¶ 3; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Ge-
neva Convention) art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
253. Steven Greer, Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment Really ‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?,
15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 107 (2015); see also Sumner B. Twiss, Torture, Jus-
tification, and Human Rights: Toward an Absolute Proscription, 29 HUM. RTS.
Q. 346, 365 (2007); Cheryln Chang, The Absolute Prohibition on Torture: Extra-
Legal Action and Ex Post Ratification, UCL JURIS. REV. 27, 28N31 (2007).
254. MSNBC, supra note 222.
255. Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and
Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1546N51 (2009).
256. Gäfgen v. Germany, App. No. 22978/05, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 35, ¶¶
123N124.
257. See id. at 28; see also CCPR, General Comment No. 20, art. 7; Greer,
supra note 253; Rep. of the Committee Against Torture, 90, U.N. Doc. A/45/44,
at 3 (1990).
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that threatening a person with torture causes moral anguish,
which may amount to psychological torture.258 Torture is even a
crime against humanity and a war crime during armed con-
flict,259 which shows just how serious it is. It does not matter
whether a candidate for public office will make good on his or
her promise to violate a norm of customary international law.
Just in as much as inchoate crimes like incitement to genocide
are punishable,260 a promise or plan by a presidential candidate
to violate a jus cogens norm is sufficient to disqualify them from
a presidential race.261
As already noted, the prohibition of torture is part of custom-
ary international law and is a norm of jus cogens.262 Without
Oo&ltb 7tJe'e eiist toOah &ni%e'saH 'e%&Hsion aLainst to't&'e5263
anO 7tJe *'oJilition aLainst to't&'e im*oses on states olHiLa`
tions erga omnes, that is, obligations owed towards all other
membe's oM tJe inte'nationaH Qomm&nith^5264 In the case of Pros-
ecutor v. Furundzija, the court commented on the prohibition of
to't&'e as MoHHojs< 7!eQa&se tJe im*o'tanQe oM tJe %aH&es it *'o`
tects, this principle has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus
258. See Baldeón-García v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), no. 147, ¶ 119 (Apr. 6, 2006); Maritza Urrutia v.
Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 103, ¶ 92 (Nov. 27, 2003); Tibi v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no.7, ¶ 47 (Sept. 7, 2004); see also
Soering v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 74/1980, U.N. Doc., 7 July 1989, Series A Vol.
161, ¶ 111; Miguel Angel Estrella v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 74/1980, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2. CCPR/C/OP/2, 93, ¶ 8(3), 10 (March 29, 1983).
259. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7N8, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
260. See LARRYMAY, GENOCIDE: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 189 (2010).
261. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98,
41344/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003) [hereinafter Welfare Party Case].
262. See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶
30N31 (2001); ASSOC. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE & CENTER FOR JUSTICE
AND INT’L LAW; TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, A GUIDE TO JURISPRUDENCE 6
(2008); Greer, supra note 253, at 8; Erika De Wet, The Prohibition of Torture
as an International Norm of jus cogens and Its Implications for National and
Customary Law, 15 EJIL 97, 97N98 (2004); and EVANS AND MORGAN,
PREVENTING TORTURE: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT 62N64 (1998).
263. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judg-
ment, ¶ 147 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998).
264. Id. ¶ 153.
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cogens that is a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the interna-
tionaH Jie'a'QJh tJan t'eath Haj anO e%en 3o'Oina'h’ Q&stoma'h
'&Hes^5265 Now that norms of jus cogens are hierarchically higher
than any other rights or state obligation,266 President Donald
6'&m*’s s&**ort of torture should have necessitated his disqual-
ification from the presidential race. Further, in terms of Article
10 (2) of the CAT, state parties shall ensure that the rule on the
prohibition of torture is included in the rules or instructions that
gove'n tJe O&ties anO M&nQtions oM 7*e'sonsjJo mah le in%oH%eO
in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual sub-
jected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment . . . [in-
QH&OinL *&lHiQ oMMiQiaHsn^5267 For that reason, a candidate for pub-
lic office who plans or promises to violate norms of customary
international law, in particular, those that are jus cogens, must
be disqualified from running for public office. Although this dis-
qualification limits the right of the concerned candidate to par-
ticipate in politics, and the right to vote of those who would oth-
erwise have voted for him or her, such a limitation is justifiable,
meant to pursue a legitimate aim, necessary, and proportion-
ate.268 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled
that a measure taken by a state to limit certain rights of citizens,
to reflect generally recognized rules of international law, or to
comply with customary international law is necessary, as it pur-
s&es a HeLitimate aim anO 7Qannot in *'inQi*He le 'eLa'OeO as
im*osinL a Ois*'o*o'tionate 'est'iQtion5 on tJe enIohment oM
rights.269
C. State Obligation to Exclude Anti-Human Rights Candidates
from Election
In addition to the fact that the prohibition of torture is a norm
of jus cogens, there is a basis in international law for a state to
exclude an anti-human rights candidate from running for public
office. Under customary international human rights law, states
265. Id. ¶ 153.
266. MATTHEWH. KRAMER, TORTURE ANDMORAL INTEGRITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 2N19 (2014).
267. G.A. Res. 39/46, supra note 6, at 115N16.
268. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, supra note 262, ¶ 56.
269. Id.
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are the bearers of international human rights obligations.270 A
state is responsible for human rights violations, where such vio-
lations are committed by state organs, such as the judiciary, leg-
islature, executive, and its bureaucracy.271 Even where a state
agent—for example, a police or administrative officer—acts out-
side his authority, the state is still responsible if such agent pur-
portedly acted in his official capacity.272 States have an interna-
tional obligation to prevent human rights violations,273 and such
an obligation includes taking the necessary measures to exclude
from public office candidates who plan to implement policies that
are inconsistent with human rights norms once they assume
public office, in particular, those that are part of customary in-
ternational law.
States have obligations to respect, ensure, protect, promote,
and fulfil the human rights of citizens and persons within their
jurisdiction. To respect human rights, a state must not interfere
jitJ tJe enIohment oM 'iLJts^ Wn o'Oe' to *'oteQt Qitigens’ 'iLJtsb
a state must protect citizens from actions of private parties by
taking positive action in the facilitation of the enjoyment of
rights.274 A state is responsible for actions of non-state actors if
it fails to exercise due diligence or take reasonable measures to
prevent, punish, investigate, or redress such violations.275 Thus,
270. DANIELMOECKLI ET AL., INTERNATIONALHUMAN RIGHTS LAW 120 (2014);
REBECCA COOK, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 229 (2012).
271. INT’LL.COMM’N., supra note 153, ch. IV.E; see alsoMOECKLI ET AL., supra
note 270, at 123.
272. INT’L L. COMM’N., supra note 153, art. 7; see also Sarma v. Sri Lanka,
Communication No. 950/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000, ¶¶ 9(2)N9(5)
(July 31, 2003).
273. OLIVIER SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 453 (2014); DINAH SHELTON & PAOLO CAROZZA,
REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOLUME 1 578 (2013); JUAN CARLOS,
THERIGHTS OF VICTIMS INCRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEEDINGS FOR SERIOUSHUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 88 (2013).
274. See U.N. Off. High Commissioner for Hum. Rts., International Human
Rights Law,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx
(last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
275. Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, ¶ 8; FRANCISCOMARTIN
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES,
CASES, ANDANALYSIS 71 (2006); MOECKLI ET AL., supra note 270, at 124; see also
KJETILLARSEN, THEHUMANRIGHTSTREATYOBLIGATIONS OFPEACEKEEPERS 128
(2012); ANURADHA KUMAR, HUMAN RIGHTS 274 (2002); Velasquez Rodriguez v.
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there is a general agreement in international practice276 tJat 7an
omission by [a] state can constitute a human rights violation,
e%en iM tJe aQt&aH Ja'm jas inMHiQteO lh *'i%ate *a'ties^5277
Before occupying public office, candidates are private citizens.
Thus, a demagogue who plans to violate human rights norms
that are part of customary international law does so as a private
person or entity. Thus, it is an actionable omission for a state
not to disqualify the candidacy of such a person from election, as
the United States and other countries have done. For a state to
be found liable for human rights violations based on an omission,
there should be some action realistically expected from the
state,278 since not every non-action of a state qualifies as an
omission.279 There must be a clear wrongful act or omission at-
tributable to the state and in violation of its international obli-
gation.280 Where there is a clear obligation, a state is expected
7to Oo aHH tJat Qan 'easonalHh le ei*eQteO to prevent human
'iLJts al&ses lh *'i%ate *a'ties^5281 It has been observed that
7tJe ei*eQtation &*on a state inQ'eases iM tJe state knojsb o'
should have known, that a person or entity poses a risk to an-
otJe'’s enIohment oM J&man 'iLJts^5282 In the classic example of
Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), no. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1998); U.N. OFF.
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 17,
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/training9chapter1en.pdf.
276. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 275, at 71.
277. NÏRAJ NATHWANI, RETHINKING REFUGEE LAW 60 (2003); BURNS WESTON
& ANNA GREAR, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEWORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION
175 (2016).
278. Id.; see also MARKOS KARAVIAS, CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 (2013); MOECKLI ET AL., supra note 270, at 124.
279. NATHWANI, supra note 277, at 60; MOECKLI ET AL., supra note 270, at
119. Further, in international human rights law, 7a state is clearly not respon-
sible for every act or omission which harms human rights.5 See MARIA
ERIKSSON, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 190 (2011).
280. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 48
(2015); MOECKLI ET AL., supra note 270, at 119.
281. MOECKLI ET AL., supra note 270, at 124; see also NATHWANI, supra note
277, at 60; WESTON&GREAR, supra note 277, at 175.
282. MOECKLI ET AL., supra note 270, at 124; see also Osman v. United King-
dom, (2000) 29 EHHR 245, ¶ 116; see also SERAC v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96
(2002); Opuz v. Turkey (2010) 50 EHHR 28; A v. United Kingdom (1999) 27
EHHR 611; FRANCESCO FRANCIONI & NATALINO RONZITTI, WAR BY CONTRACT:
HUMANRIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 85 (2011).
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Donald Trump, where he categorically promised to approve tor-
ture in violation of a norm of jus cogens, it can be argued that a
clear obligation to prevent that violation arose. The non-disqual-
ification of his candidature, therefore, is an actionable omission,
which was in violation of the obligations of the United States to
promote human rights, protect the rights of citizens, and prevent
violations.
D. Implications of Excluding Candidates from Running for
Public Office
Excluding a candidate from running for public office, for what-
ever reason, presents a prima facie case of conflict of interests or
rights. In the present case, there is a potential conflict between
important rights, such as the right to vote, participate in the pol-
itiQs oM one’s Qo&ntry, freedom of expression, and state obliga-
tions to protect citizens from actions of private parties. It should
be noted that in balancing competing interests,283 rights can be
283. Obbo and Another v. Attorney-General (2004) AHRLR 256 (UgSC 2004)
¶¶ 28N31; see also OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 517 (2014); ALISON BRYSK, GLOBALIZATION OF
LAW ANDHUMANRIGHTS: FROMNORMS TO FULFILMENT 68 (2013).
2018] Customary International Law and Public Office 447
limited for the common good,284 for a legitimate aim,285 for neces-
sity,286 for proportionality,287 and if justified in a democratic so-
ciety288 in order to remain consistent with the constitution and
international law.289
1. Freedom of Expression, the Right to Participate in Politics,
and the Right to Vote
The international community has long realized the importance
of the rights to vote and participate in an election. The rights to
vote and participate in an election are provided for in many in-
ternational and regional treaties, such as the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),290 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,291 the American Convention on
Human Rights,292 the ECHR,293 the Arab Charter on Human
Rights,294 anO tJe AM'iQan CJa'te' on X&man anO :eo*Hes’
Rights.295 Article 25 of ICCPR specifically provides as follows:
284. Kemai and Others v. Attorney General and Others (2005) AHRLR 118
(KeHC 2000) ¶ 40; see also BRIAN STILTNER, RELIGION AND THE COMMONGOOD:
CATHOLIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO BUILDING COMMUNITY IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 152
(1999); JATINDRAKUMAR, HUMANRIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 31 (2016).
285. Ndyanabo v. Attorney-General (2002) AHRLR 243 (TzCA 2002) ¶¶ 18,
33N37, 40, 41, 44; HELEN FENWICK, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 726
(2009).
286. Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR
1998) ¶¶ 64N71; ALEX CONTE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISM: COMMONWEALTH APPROACHES: THE UNITED
KINGDOM, CANADA, AUSTRALIA ANDNEW ZEALAND 313 (2010).
287. MICHEL ROSENFELD & ANDRÁS SAJÓ, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 740 (2012); Attorney-General v. 3Mopa
(2002) AHRLR 91 (LeCA 2002) ¶ 33.
288. TOM CAMPBELL, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND
INSTITUTIONS 154 (2003); Amnesty Int’l and Others v. Sudan (2000) AHRLR
297 ¶¶ 59, 80,
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/26th/comunications/48.90-50.91-52.91-
89.93/achpr26_48.90_50.91_52.91_89.93_eng.pdf.
289. Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 186 (ACHPR 1995) ¶ 15;
BERTRANDRAMCHARAN, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (1985).
290. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 6, art. 25.
291. G.A. Res. 217, supra note 252, art. 21.
292. American Convention on Human Rights art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
293. ECHR, supra note 252, art. 11.
294. Council of the League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights,
Sept. 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151 (1997).
295. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 252, art. 13.
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Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without un-
reasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors.296
According to General Comment 25 on the right to participate
in public affairs, voting rights, and the right of equal access to
*&lHiQ se'%iQeb 7A'tiQHe EA Hies at tJe Qo'e oM OemoQ'atiQ Lo%e'n`
ment based on the consent of the people and in conformity with
tJe *'inQi*Hes oM tJe Co%enant^5297As a result, states are strongly
urged to refrain from excluding candidates from running for
public office where there are no justifiable reasons. To that end,
Yene'aH Comment EA *'o%iOes tJat 7otnJe eMMeQti%e im*Hementa`
tion of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office
ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candi-
dates. . . . Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election
should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory re-
quirements.298
Further, there is no doubt that freedom of expression plays an
inteL'aH *a't in eHeQtions anO eMMeQtinL Qitigens’ 'iLJts to %ote anO
participate in politics.299 In this regard, General Comment 25
notes tJat 7M'eeOom oM ei*'essionb assemlHh anO assoQiation a'e
essential conditions for the effective exercise of the right to vote
anOm&st le M&HHh *'oteQteO^5300 6J&sb 7in o'Oe' to ens&'e tJe M&HH
enjoyment of rights protected by Article 25, the free communica-
tion of information and ideas about public and political issues
296. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 12,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis added).
297. The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right
of Equal Access to Public Service, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 ¶ 1 (Dec. 07, 1996)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 25]
298. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17 (emphasis added).
299. See United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey 26 E. H. R.
R. 121, 147 (1998)
[hereinafter United Communist Party of Turkey case]; ECHR, supra note 252,
¶¶ 42N43.
300. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 297, ¶¶ 8, 12.
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between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is es-
sentiaH^5301 It has also been noted that freedom of expression en-
taiHs M'eeOom to 'eQei%e anO im*a't not onHh 7inMo'mation o'
ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or
as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock
o' Oist&'l^5302 One of the famous statements of the French phi-
losopher Voltaire is on freedom of expression, where he states,
7W Oisa**'o%e oM jJat ho& sahb l&t W jiHH OeMenO to tJe OeatJ ho&'
'iLJt to sah it^5303 In the same vein, the ECHR has observed that
the principal characteristic of democracy is freedom of expres-
sionb sinQe 7OemoQ'aQh tJ'i%es on M'eeOom oM ei*'ession^5304
Given the importance of freedom of expression and the right to
*a'tiQi*ate in tJe *oHitiQs oM one’s Qo&nt'hb tJe question becomes
jJetJe'b in tJe 4niteO 8tatesb ronaHO 6'&m*’s o*inions anO
statements against human rights should have disqualified him
from the presidential race. The question becomes more compli-
cated when one considers the fact that nations have the right to
change and amend their constitutions, including rights that are
protected therein, and states can withdraw from human rights
treaties or those that have a direct implication on the protection
of human rights.305 Therefore, if it is in the purview of a state or
nation to amend its constitution and to withdraw from an inter-
national treaty, is there any justification to exclude a candidate
who expresses his or her plans to amend the constitution and do
away with certain rights when he or she assumes office? The
question can be answered by considering the framework of the
limitation of rights. It is important, however, to make clear that
the stakes are different when a candidate for public office speaks
against or plans to violate a norm of customary international law
301. General Comment No. 25, supra note 297, ¶ 25.
302. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment, Dec. 7, 1976 (ser. A) No.
5493/72, ¶ 24,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57499; Jersild v. Denmark, Judgment,
Sept. 23, 1994 (ser. A) No. 298, 19 E. H. R. R. 1, 15 (1995), ¶ 37.
303. See KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 114 (2004).
304. United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 299, ¶ 57;
see also PETER KEMPEES, A SYSTEMATIC GUIDE TO THE CASE-LAW OF THE
EUROPEANCOURT OFHUMAN RIGHTS: 1997N1998, 469 (2000).
305. See Emmanuel Igunza, African Union Backs Mass Withdrawal From
ICC, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
3882607.
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or jus cogens. Even states cannot excuse themselves from cus-
tomary international law and norms of jus cogens.
2. Limitation of Rights
Whenever there is a prima facie conflict of rights, fair balanc-
ing is inherent in the binding effect of international human
rights law instruments that are signed and ratified by a state.306
So'e sob 7tJe sea'QJ Mo' Mai' laHanQe letjeen QonMHiQtinL inte'`
ests may be universally inherent in [human rights] adjudica-
tion^5307 Wn some Qasesb Qo&'ts jiHH seek 7a I&st laHanQe between
the protection of the general interest of the community and the
'es*eQt O&e to M&nOamentaH J&man 'iLJts^5308
General Comment 25 provides that the right to participate in
tJe *oHitiQs oM one’s Qo&nt'hb o' tJe 'iLJt to JoHO *&lHiQ oMMiQebmah
be limited on grounds that are justifiable, objective, reasonable,
and established by law.309 Wn tJose Qi'Q&mstanQesb 7states *a'ties
should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which ex-
QH&Oe anh L'o&* o' QateLo'h oM *e'sons M'om eHeQti%e oMMiQe^5310
Paragraph 17 of General Comment 25 is instructive. It provides
tJat jJiHe 7*oHitiQaH o*inion mah not le &seO as a L'o&nO to Oe`
*'i%e anh *e'son oM tJe 'iLJt to stanO Mo' eHeQtionb5 tJis is 7jitJ`
out prejudice to paragraph (1) of [A]rticle 5 of the Covenant
[ICCPR]^5311 A'tiQHe AfGd oM tJe WCC:9 *'o%iOes tJat 7onnotJinL
in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or per-
form any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms recognized herein^5312 For that reason, while Donald
Trump has a right to freedom of expression, such right may not
be used to harm others, worse still, to attack human rights
norms that are part of customary international law. Even states
do not have that right in international law.
306. JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: A STUDY OF PROPORTIONALITY,
SUBSIDIARITY AND PRIMARITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
198 (2009).
307. Id.
308. Belgian Linguistic Case (A/6) 1 E. H. R. R 252, 253, Merits, July 23,
1968, (ser. A) No. 6, Case 4/73, at 32; see also Nold, Kohlen-und
Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Comm’n of the European Cmty, ECR, 1974 E. C. R.
309. General Comment No. 25, supra note 297, ¶ 4, 15.
310. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18
311. Id. ¶ 17.
312. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 6, art. 5(1); see alsoGeneral Comment
No. 25, supra note 297, ¶ 27 (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the limitation on the rights to vote and run for
public office is not something new. In fact, it was approved by
the ECHR in the Welfare Party case.313 Leaders of the Welfare
Party made it clear, on many occasions, that they were against
secularism, as guaranteed in the Turkish Constitution, and
*'omiseO to 7estalHisJ tJe s&*'emaQh oM tJe Uo'an tJ'o&LJ a
holy war (jihad) and that Muslims should therefore make dona-
tions to Refah [the Welfare Party] rather than distributing alms
to tJi'O *a'ties^5314 Furthermore, one of the Members of Parlia-
ment belonging to the Welfare Party also clearly and publicly
stateO tJat 7ojne sJaHH Qe'tainHh QaHH to aQQo&nt tJose jJo t&'n
their backs on the precepts of the Koran and those who deprive
AHHaJ’sSessenLe' oM Jis I&'isOiQtion in tJei' Qo&nt'h^5315
In January 1998, after hearing arguments from both parties,
the Constitutional Court of Turkey dissolved the Welfare Party
because of its anti-secularism rhetoric and campaign.316 Further,
some leaders of the Welfare Party were banned from active pol-
itics.317 While noting the importance of freedom of expression
and political opinion, the Constitutional Court of Turkey noted
that secularism is an indispensable condition of democracy in
Turkey318 anO a *oHitiQaH *a'th jJose HeaOe'sJi* *&'s&es 7aQti%`
ities aimed at bringing the democratic order to an end . . . us[ing]
its freedom of expression to issue calls to action to achieve that
aimb5 is not *'oteQteO lh tJe Constit&tion anO J&man 'iLJts
treaties.319 Leaders of the Welfare Party approached the ECHR,
alleging that the dissolution of the Welfare Party was a violation
of Article 11 (1) of European Charter on Human Rights, which
guarantees freedom of assembly. The question considered by the
Court was whether the dissolution of the Welfare Party could be
justified in terms of the limitation provided for in Article 11 (2)
of the European Charter, which provides as follows:
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
313. Welfare Party Case, supra note 261, ¶¶ 63, 64.
314. Id. ¶ 12.
315. Id. ¶ 33.
316. See id. ¶ 23.
317. See Chris Morris, Turkey’s Welfare Party is Banned, BBCNEWS (Jan. 16,
1998, 3:20 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/despatches/48001.stm.
318. SeeWelfare Party Case, supra note 261, ¶ 25.
319. See id. ¶ 40.
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a democratic society in the interests of national security or pub-
lic safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.320
The Grand Chamber of the ECHR held that the dissolution of
the Welfare Parth jas not onHh 7*'esQ'ileO lh Hajb5321 but was
necessary in a democratic society, proportionate, met a pressing
social need, and was meant for a legitimate aim of protecting the
rights and freedoms of others.322 More importantly, the Grand
Chamber held that a state Jas a 'iLJt to 7im*ose on its se'%inL
or future civil servants, who will be required to wield a portion
of its sovereign power, the duty to refrain from taking part in the
WsHamiQ M&nOamentaHist mo%ementb5323 or other activities that
undermine human rights and democratic institutions. Thus,
while candidates for public office or political parties are within
their political rights to suggest, promote, or plan to change the
law or the legal and constitutional structures of their nations,
they can only do so under the following two conditions:
Firstly, the means used to that end must be legal and demo-
cratic; secondly, the change proposed must itself be compatible
with fundamental democratic principles. It necessarily follows
that a political party whose leaders incite to violence or put for-
ward a policy which fails to respect democracy or which is
aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the
rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay
QHaim to tJe Con%ention’s *'oteQtion aLainst penalties imposed
on those grounds.324
A fortiori, as a matter of the law, no one has the right to con-
duct themselves, speak or plan to destroy the rights or freedoms
320. ECHR, supra note 252, art. 11(2) (emphasis added).
321. Welfare Party Case, supra note 261, ¶ 64.
322. Id. ¶¶ 67, 135.
323. Id. ¶ 94; see also Yanasik v.,Turkey, no. 14524/89, Commission Decision,
Jan. 6, 1993, DR 74 D. R. 22, 27.
324. Welfare Party Case, supra note 261, ¶ 98; see also Herri Batasuna and
Batasuna v Spain, nos. 25803/04 and 25817/04, ¶ 79, Eur. Ct. H. R. 321, 329,
(2009) [hereinafter Batasuna Case]; Yazar and Others v. Turkey, nos.
22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93, ¶ 49, Eur. Ct. H. R. 395, 412 (2002); Ilinden
v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, ¶ 97, Eur. Ct. H. R. 273, 303IX; So-
cialist Party and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III
Eur. Ct. H. R. 1238, 1256N57, ¶¶ 46N47.
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of others.325 6o tJe same enOb 7no one m&st le a&tJo'iogneO to
rely on [human rights] provisions in order to weaken or destroy
tJe iOeaHs anO %aH&es oM a OemoQ'atiQ soQieth^5326
The same arguments were considered in the Batasuna case,
which considered a Spanish law on political parties imposing an
obligation to respect democratic principles and human rights.327
Section 9 (2) (a) of the Spanish law provides that a political party
sJaHH le OissoH%eO iM it is in%oH%eO in 7shstematiQaHHh %ioHatinL
fundamental freedoms and rights by promoting, justifying or ex-
cusing attacks on the life or integrity of the person, or the exclu-
sion or persecution of an individual by reason of ideology, reli-
Lionb leHieMsb nationaHithb 'aQeb sei o' sei&aH o'ientation^5328 It
has been made clear that the purpose of the law is neither to
inhibit freedom of expression and association nor to paralyze
doctrines that call the Spanish constitutional framework into
(&estion^ 9atJe'b it is to OeaH jitJ 7tJosejJose *oHitiQaH aQti%ith
is based on an accommodation with violence, political support
for terrorist organisations or violation of the rights of citizens or
OemoQ'atiQ *'inQi*Hes^5329
Likewise, in Resolution 1308, the Council for Europe has rec-
ognized the need to regulate the activities of political parties in
Member States and where there is need, disqualify or dissolve a
political parth 7tJat &ses %ioHenQe o' tJ'eatens Qi%iH *eaQe anO
tJe OemoQ'atiQ Qonstit&tionaH o'Oe' oM tJe Qo&nt'h^5330 Therefore,
there is a limitation on what one can say or do during their pres-
idential campaign or campaign for public office. World leaders
like President Donald Trump have crossed the line, with the
United States allowing it.
325. See Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, 1 Y. B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 222
(July 20, 1957).
326. Welfare Party Case, supra note 261, ¶ 99.
327. Juan Carlos I, Spain’s Institutional Law no. 6/2002, sec. 9(1) (Ley Or-
gánica 6/2002 de Partidos Políticos, 154 Official State Gazette art. 9(1) (2002)
(Spain) [hereinafter Spain’s Institutional Law]; see also Batasuna Case, supra
note 324, ¶ 12.
328. Spain’s Institutional Law, supra note 327, sec. 9(2)(a).
329. Batasuna Case, supra note 324, ¶ 12.
330. Eur. Parl. Ass., Restrictions on Political Parties in the Council of Europe
Member States, 1308th Sess., Doc. No. 9526, Res. 1308, sec. 11(ii) (2002),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=17063&lang=en.
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CONCLUSION
It can be noted that while there are various factors that have
contributed to the rise of populism, the media has played a huge
role in the dissemination of populist propaganda and ideology.
There is no doubt that the current wave of populism challenges
and undermines liberal democracy, human rights, and constitu-
tionalism. Furthermore, in various ways, populism influences
the justice system when populists seek to please their constitu-
encies by aligning with the public sense of justice or when judges
ride the populist momentum. In this populist age, it is important
to emphasize that international law authorizes states to disqual-
ify anti-human rights candidates from running for public office.
In certain circumstances, especially those involving human
rights norms that are part of customary international law, there
is a state obligation to exclude those who plan to violate them.
Of course, such exclusion limits certain rights, such as freedom
of expression, the right to vote, and the right to run for public
office. These limitations, however, are justified by necessity,
since it pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate to the
threat posed.
The argument and suggestion that anti-human rights candi-
dates must be excluded from running for public office goes to the
root of democracy and protection of human rights. Public offi-
cials play a fundamental role in the promotion, protection, and
realization of human rights. The conduct of public officials, es-
pecially those occupying powerful offices, influence and affect
the public.331 It is important, therefore, that those who occupy
public offices respect human rights. As was noted in one Indian
Qaseb 7Mo' OemoQ'aQh to s&'%i%eb it is essential that the best avail-
alHe men sJo&HO le QJosen as *eo*He’s 'e*'esentati%es Mo' *'o*e'
governance of the country. This can be achieved through men of
JiLJ mo'aH anO etJiQaH %aH&es^5332 In a nutshell, the following
words by Justice Dipak Misra are of essence:
331. International Centre for Policy and Conflict & 5 others v. Attorney-Gen-
eral [2013] eKLR, ¶ 133, http://www.kenyalaw.org/Down-
loads_FreeCases/552of2012.pdf; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SERIOUS CRIME
AND THE REQUIREMENT OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE:
PROCEEDINGS 16 (1997).
332. People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Another v. Union of India and An-
other, [2013] 12 S.C.R. 283, 319 (India).
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In a respectable and elevated constitutional democracy, purity
of election . . . sanctity of individual dignity, sacrosanctity of
rule of law . . . credibility of institutions, integrity and respect-
ability of those who run the institutions [is] absolutely signifi-
cant, in a way, imperative. They are not only to be treated as
essential concepts and remembered as glorious precepts but
also to be practised so that in the conduct of every individual
they are concretely and fruitfully manifested.333
As has been noted in this article, some may argue that even if
a populist demagogue is elected, he or she may not be able to
implement their campaign plans because checks and balances
exist in constitutional democracies. That is not a strong argu-
ment, however, as populist demagogues have in the past under-
mined democratic institutions by packing them with sympathiz-
ers. In a clear case where a political candidate promises and
plans to violate important norms of human rights, he or she
must be excluded from running for public office.
Furthermore, to formulate effective solutions to the challenges
that are posed by populism to human rights, as discussed in this
article, it is important to understand the root cause of populism
and the nature of the danger it poses to human rights. As has
leen olse'%eO lh :JiHi* AHstonb Mo' eiam*Heb 7tJe J&man 'iLJts
movement needs to develop a spirit of introspection and open-
ness^ Xisto'iQaHHhb it Jas not 'es*onOeO jeHH to Q'itiQism^5334 It is
in that light that Makau Mutua has observed the following:
The human rights movement is presented by its scholars and
advocates as above politics. . . . They paint it as a universal
creed driven by nobility and higher human intelligence. The
idiom of human rights is tinged with metaphors and language
that suggests eternity or a final resting point in human history.
The basic human rights documents are not presented as either
instrumentalist, utilitarian, experimental, or convenient. Ra-
ther, the authors speak as though such documents are the final
truth. This elusive, yet lofty, idealism is almost biblical in its
forbidding language. It implies that questioning its doctrine is
perverse and unwelcome. The reality, however, is that human
333. Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Others, No.1478 (S. Ct. India 2015).
334. Alston, supra note 41, at 4.
456 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:2
rights norms address mundane human problems and are rou-
tine politics.335
For that stronger criticism, Alston notes the need for the hu-
man 'iLJts Qomm&nith 7to Oe%ote mo'e time anO eMMo't to leinL
persuasive and convincing, rather than simply annunciating our
principles as though they were self-evidently correct and appli-
QalHe^5336
A good example that has been cited in this article is the idea
that populism is thriving because of socioeconomic challenges
that the human rights project has failed to address. It is im-
portant, therefore, for the human rights corpus to start taking
socioeconomic rights as full-fledged human rights, which, just
Hike Qi%iH anO *oHitiQaH 'iLJtsb neeO tJe 7essentiaH eHements oM
'eQoLnitionb instit&tionaHigationb anO aQQo&ntaliHith^5337 Fur-
thermore, in the age of populism, human rights NGOs need to
understand that there can never be a substitute for strengthen-
ing human rights protections at the domestic level. For that rea-
sonb it is neQessa'h tJat RY;s anO aQti%ists sta't to 7Ja%e Hess
of an extractive character (extracting information and leaving)
and focus more on building or complementing national capac-
ith^5338 It may also be important for activists to start taking into
account the fact that human rights—while playing a very im-
portant part in society—are not a panacea, as they need to work
hand in glove with other disciplines to achieve a better future for
all.339 These ideas are critical in mapping the way forward be-
cause the challenges that are posed to human rights, as have
been discussed in this article, are also the result of weaknesses
in the human rights project.
335. Makau Mutua, The Transformation of Africa: A Critique of the Rights
Discourse, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 910
(Felipe Gómez Isa & Koen de Feyter eds., 2009); see alsoMutua, supra note 45.
336. Alston, supra note 41, at 11.
337. Id. at 9.
338. Id. at 8.
339. Dudai, supra note 44, at 17.
